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Role  of  the  Dollar. 
How  Much  Symmetry? 
ON AUGUST 15, 1971, the postwar  international  monetary  system  estab- 
lished in 1944 at Bretton  Woods was brought  to an end by the United 
States'  formal  termination  of an undertaking  that had in fact been  largely 
inoperative  for some  time:  its commitment  under  the  Articles  of Agreement 
of the International  Monetary  Fund to maintain  the parity  of the dollar 
by converting  dollar  balances  held by foreign  official  institutions  into gold 
at a fixed  price  on demand.  Roughly  a year  later, at the September  1972 
annual  meeting  of the Board  of Governors  of the International  Monetary 
Fund, the Secretary  of the Treasury  put forth a proposal  for a reformed 
international  monetary  system.  In place of a system  in which the dollar 
occupied  a unique  position,  the U.S. proposal  envisaged  one characterized 
by far greater  symmetry  among all currencies.  Such symmetry,  or legal 
equality of rights and responsibilities,  was also envisioned  at Bretton 
Woods, but in practice  the system  functioned  very differently  indeed.  A 
careful  survey  of recent  developments  suggests  that  the quest  for symmetry 
is likely  to prove  as chimerical  today  as it did  thirty  years  ago, and  that  in a 
viable  international  monetary  system  the dollar  and the United States  are 
almost  certain  to continue  to play special  roles. 
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Achievement  of Consistency  in External  Policy  Targets 
The issue of symmetry  versus  asymmetry  lies at the heart of ensuring 
consistency  in the international  monetary  system.  In a world of n inter- 
dependent  countries,  only n -  1 external  policies  (be they exchange  rate 
policies,  reserve  targets,  or whatever)  can be independently  determined.  If 
each of the n countries  tries  to set its policy independently,  these policies 
are  almost  certain  to be inconsistent.  The  result  may  very  well  be a negative- 
sum game,  in which  the countries  end up collectively  worse  off than they 
were  initially. 
Conceptually,  the consistency  problem  can be resolved  in three ways. 
One  is via an automatic,  self-disciplining  system,  such  as the textbook  gold 
standard  or freely  floating  exchange  rates  without  official  intervention.  A 
second approach  relies on collective  adherence  to the decisions  of some 
international-or,  more  properly,  supranational-institution,  which  would 
substitute  some mixture  of rules  and discretionary  judgment  for automa- 
ticity in developing  consistent  compromises  among  member  countries.  A 
third  approach,  variously  known  as the "key  currency"  or "nth  country" 
solution,  calls for one country  (or group of countries)  to eschew  its own 
targets  (thus  ensuring  the consistency  of the other  n -  1 targets)  in favor 
of taking  special  responsibility  for the operation  of the system  itself. 
In the  real  world,  of course,  things  are  never  as clear-cut  as this  taxonomy 
suggests,  and some  mixture  of these  three  ordering  principles  has generally 
prevailed.  Even  during  the heyday  of the classical  gold standard  from 1879 
to 1914,  the international  system  apparently  operated  a good  deal  less auto- 
matically  than textbooks  suggest.  And it functioned  successfully,  in the 
opinion  of many,  only because  Great  Britain  assumed  special  responsibil- 
ities as the center  country.  After the First World  War the United States 
began to take international  monetary  leadership,  although  the monetary 
chaos  that characterized  most of the interwar  period  attested,  in one view, 
to the reluctance  and inexperience  with which  this country  exercised  that 
role.' Certainly  the concept  of "dominant  countries"  and "key  currencies" 
underlay  the Tripartite  Monetary  Agreement  of 1936,  in which  the govern- 
ments  of the United  States,  Great  Britain,  and  France  agreed  to cooperate 
1. See Charles  P. Kindleberger,  The World  in Depression,  1929-1939 (University  of 
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in the defense  of exchange  rates  against  international  flows of hot money. 
Despite its failure  to restore  order  to the international  monetary  system, 
the Tripartite  Agreement  did set an important  precedent  for international 
monetary  cooperation. 
THE  DOLLAR  IN  THE BRETTON  WOODS  SYSTEM 
The Articles  of Agreement  of the International  Monetary  Fund reflect 
two basic  principles:  that of collective  or cooperative  responsibility  for the 
operation  of the international  monetary  system  and, after  a transition  pe- 
riod, that of legal symmetry  or equality  in the rights  and obligations  of 
the member  countries.  But  the rules  of the system  were  far from  automatic 
or self-enforcing;  in the amount of discretionary  decisionmaking  power 
ostensibly  ceded  to the IMF, the system  envisaged  at Bretton  Woods  came 
closer  than any previous  arrangement  to invoking  the principle  of adher- 
ence to the  judgments  of an international  institution. 
Among  those  whose  views  were  rejected  at Bretton  Woods  were  the pro- 
ponents  of a "key currency"  system,  who took the Tripartite  Agreement 
of 1936 as their model.2  And yet, from the very beginning,  the Bretton 
Woods system  drifted  away  from its original  concept  of equality  toward 
reliance  on a single  key currency,  the U.S. dollar.  During  the first  decade 
or so after  Bretton  Woods,  it was the United States,  rather  than the IMF, 
that made  the bulk of loans to member  countries  experiencing  balance-of- 
payments  difficulties.  And it was the United States,  rather  than the Fund, 
that took the lead in urging  other  countries  to adopt policies  to stabilize 
their  payments  positions,  including  the substantial  devaluations  of the cur- 
rencies  of most major  industrialized  countries  against  the dollar  in 1949. 
The asymmetrical  role of the dollar  in the Bretton  Woods  system  devel- 
oped  in several  different  dimensions.  Because  it was backed  by the world's 
largest  and strongest  economy and because  it was, until 1958, the only 
major  currency  that enjoyed  market  convertibility,  the dollar  served  as the 
major  international  vehicle,  or transaction,  currency,  even in transactions 
involving  no American  resident.  Second,  under  the Articles  of Agreement 
all countries  were  to maintain  the value  of their  currencies  within  a stated 
range  of parity,  but  the  United  States  undertook  to discharge  this  obligation 
2. See Harry G. Johnson, "Political Economy Aspects of International  Monetary 
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by buying  and selling  gold for monetary  purposes  at the fixed  price  of $35 
per fine ounce, while other countries  did so through  intervention  in the 
foreign  exchange  markets.  This  unique  obligation  reflected,  in turn,  another 
aspect  of asymmetry:  as other  currencies  became  convertible,  most mone- 
tary  authorities  used  the dollar  in exchange  market  intervention.  The  dollar 
also became  the numeraire  of the IMF in which  most currencies  were  de- 
fined,  while  it itself was defined  in terms  of gold. 
The Articles  of Agreement  provided  no convenient  mechanism  for the 
secular  growth  of international  reserves.  As the  combination  of newly  mined 
gold for monetary  purposes  and positions  in the International  Monetary 
Fund failed  to expand  sufficiently  to keep up with world  liquidity  needs, 
the dollar  filled  the breach,  and,  in fact,  became  the major  source  of growth 
in international  reserves  in the postwar  period.  Finally,  because  of its spe- 
cial place in the system, the United States played the passive, or nth- 
country,  role  in the  exchange-rate  adjustment  process;  other  countries  from 
time to time changed  the par value of their currencies  against  the dollar 
and gold, but the value of the dollar  itself remained  fixed in relation  to 
gold and therefore  to other  currencies  collectively. 
The progression  from  the "dollar  shortage"  of the 1950s  to the "dollar 
glut"  of the  late 1960s  and  the  cumulating  problems  and  ultimate  collapse  of 
the gold-dollar  standard  are  too well  known  to require  repeating,  although 
controversy  over their  basic causes  continues.  In the view of Triffin,  who 
predicted  the collapse  of the gold-dollar  standard  as early  as 1960,3  deterio- 
ration  of any  dominant-currency  standard  is inevitable.  He traces  this dete- 
rioration  through  an initial  stage  of financial  irresponsibility  resulting  from 
the "exorbitant  privilege"  of a dominant  currency;  a second  stage  of cur- 
rency  overvaluation,  a loss of jobs and  markets  from  the resulting  demand 
shift, and an accompanying  fall in interest  rates which aggravates  the 
balance-of-payments  problem;  and a third  and final  stage  of revived  pro- 
tectionism,  interest  rate  reductions,  skyrocketing  payments  deficit,  and an 
ultimately  irresistible  wave  of speculation  against  the dominant  currency.4 
Whether  or not one accepts  this scenario  in toto, a decline  in the liquidity 
ratio  (the ratio of reserve  assets  to liquid  liabilities)  is plainly  an inevitable 
accompaniment  of the reserve  currency  function.  By mid-1971,  this dete- 
3. Robert Triffin,  Gold  and the Dollar Crisis:  The  Future  of Convertibility  (Yale Uni- 
versity  Press, 1960). 
4. See Robert  Triffin,  "International  Monetary  Collapse  and Reconstruction  in April 
1972,"  Journal  of International  Economics,  Vol. 2 (September  1972), pp. 376-78. Marina v. N.  Whitman  543 
riorating liquidity position had combined with the accelerating U.S. infla- 
tion to produce a crisis of confidence and a flight from the dollar. 
Aspects of Symmetry in Recent Reform Proposals 
The Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971 was a first step toward 
building a  new international monetary order out  of  the rubble of  the 
Bretton Woods system. In retrospect, the effort to replace one pattern of 
fixed exchange rates with another looks  like a case of putting Humpty 
Dumpty together again. But it established two important points. First, the 
"U.S. balance-of-payments problem" was at least in part a problem of the 
international monetary system itself. Such a diagnosis implied that the 
cure-an  appropriate pattern of exchange rates-was  a matter for multi- 
lateral rather  than unilateral  or bilateral concern. Second, the United States 
was abandoning its passive, or nth-country, role in the adjustment process 
and now had explicit balance-of-payments targets of its own.5 
THE  U.S.  PROPOSAL 
The concept of symmetry implied by the Smithsonian negotiations was 
made explicit in the U.S. proposal for international monetary reform put 
forward nine months later.6 This symmetry had several aspects. One was 
the need for a symmetrical stance toward surplus and deficit countries in 
the adjustment process (in contrast with the Bretton Woods system, which 
exerted greater  pressure  for adjustment  on deficit than on surplus countries, 
apparently producing some devaluation, or at least antirevaluation, bias). 
A second was symmetrical treatment of the dollar and other currencies, a 
5. The United States had instituted  a variety  of measures  during  the 1960s aimed at 
improving  one portion or another  of its balance-of-payments  accounts.  But these mea- 
sures  were initiated  at least partly  in response  to the urgings  of foreign governments. 
6. See George P. Shultz,  "Statement  by the Governor  of the Fund and Bank for the 
United States,"  in International  Monetary  Fund, Summary  Proceedings  of the Twenty- 
seventh  Annual  Meeting  of the Board of Governors,  September  1972 (1972), pp. 34-44; 
Economic  Report  of the  President,  January  1973,  App. A, Supplement  to Chap.  5; "Quan- 
titative Indicators from the Point of View of the Overall Operation of the System" 
(memorandum  submitted  by the U.S. Deputies  of the Committee  of Twenty  to the Secre- 
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departure  from  the  passive  role  in exchange  rate  adjustment  that  the  United 
States  had previously  played.7 
This second  point  had two implications.  First,  it meant  that the United 
States  should  be able to initiate  a change  in the parity  of the dollar,  not 
simply  vis-a-vis  gold  but  effectively  vis-a-vis  other  currencies  as well.  Under 
the  Articles  of Agreement(Section  5),  the  United  States,  like  other  countries, 
had the right  to change  the dollar  parity  in conformity  with the standard 
IMF criterion  of "fundamental  disequilibrium."  But,  until  the Smithsonian 
Agreement,  it was widely  believed  that an alteration  in the gold parity  of 
the dollar  would set in train  parallel  alterations  in other  currencies,  thus 
preventing  any shift in the effective  exchange  rate of the dollar. Second, 
U.S. "freedom  of adjustment  action" implied widening  the permissible 
band of variation  in the market  rates  of exchange  between  the dollar  and 
other  currencies.  Previously,  because  the dollar  was  almost  universally  used 
as the intervention  currency,  the permissible  band  of variation  around  par- 
ity was twice as wide for any two nondollar  currencies  as it was for the 
dollar  and another  currency.  That is, permissible  bands of variation  of 1 
percent  around  dollar-mark  parity  and dollar-franc  parity  necessarily  im- 
plied  a band  of 2 percent  around  the  cross-rate  parity  between  the  mark  and 
the  franc,  within  which  no dollar  intervention  was required  of either  Ger- 
many or France.  Giving  the dollar  the same freedom  of action as other 
currencies  within  the bands  around  parity  meant  establishing  some  system 
of multicurrency  or other  nondollar  intervention. 
Besides  emphasizing  the need for greater  symmetry  in the adjustment 
process,  the U.S. proposals  also implied  a reduction  in the special  role of 
the dollar  in international  reserves,  even  though,  at the time,  the world  was 
operating  on a "pure  dollar  standard"  for the first  time.  The United  States 
proposed  that  the special  drawing  rights  (SDRs)  issued  by the  International 
Monetary  Fund  become  the formal  numeraire  of the system  and  the major 
source  of new reserves,  and that the place  of gold and national  currencies, 
primarily  the U.S. dollar,  in reserves  be gradually  reduced.  This arrange- 
ment  would  permit  the international  community  to determine  collectively 
7. A proposal advocating  symmetrical  adjustment  pressures  on surplus and deficit 
countries  had been  put forward,  unsuccessfully,  by Lord  Keynes  at Bretton  Woods.  For a 
discussion  of asymmetry  in the international  monetary  system,  see Peter  B. Kenen,  "Con- 
vertibility  and Consolidation:  A Survey  of Options  for Reform,"  in American  Economic 
Association,  Papers  and  Proceedings  of the Eighty-fifth  Annual  Meeting,  1972  (American 
Economic  Review,  Vol. 63, May 1973), pp. 191-94. Marina v. N.  Whitman  545 
the stock and growth  rate of international  reserves,  correcting  an inade- 
quacy  of the Bretton  Woods  system.  Finally,  the U.S. proposal  made  clear 
that should  the United  States  resume  convertibility  of dollar  balances  held 
by foreign  official  institutions,  it would  do so not through  a renewal  of the 
unique  responsibility  to buy  and  sell gold at a fixed  price,  but only  through 
the exercise  of obligations  parallel  to those assumed  by other  countries. 
By ending  the passive,  or nth-country,  role of the United States  in pay- 
ments adjustment  and the creation  of reserves,  the U.S. proposal  would 
eliminate  the major  mechanism  by which consistency  of national  targets 
and  policies  had been achieved  under  the Bretton  Woods  system.  The  pro- 
posal specifically  recognized  and addressed  the problem  of consistency, 
seeking  to ensure  it by a delicate  combination  of automatic  rules  and ad- 
herence  to the discretionary  judgment  of the IMF. 
The U.S. proposal  for the international  monetary  system  recognized  the 
need for compatibility  among  the adjustment  process,  the mechanism  for 
creating  reserves,  and the provisions  for convertibility  of foreign  exchange 
balances  into primary  reserve  assets.  A tight adjustment  system,  requiring 
rapid elimination  of payments  disequilibria,  implies relatively  small re- 
serves;  in the limit,  with  freely  flexible  exchange  rates,  continuous  clearing 
of exchange  markets,  and thus the prevention  of payments  disequilibria, 
needed  levels  of official  reserves  would  approach  zero.  A loose adjustment 
system,  on the other  hand, in which  payments  disequilibria  were  allowed 
to become  very  large  or persist  for a long  time,  would  require  larger  reserves 
to finance  the payments  imbalances.  Similarly,  if it is to be both feasible 
and credible, a  fixed-rate  system that offers convertibility  of foreign 
exchange  balances  into primary  reserve  assets  must  provide  for a combina- 
tion of primary  reserve  growth  (to meet convertibility  commitments)  and 
adjustment  discipline  (to limit  the accumulation  of balances  for which  con- 
version  might  be demanded). 
The United  States  proposed  to assure  consistency,  symmetry,  and effec- 
tiveness  in the adjustment  process  by the so-called  reserve  indicator  mecha- 
nism.  Specifically,  disproportionate  gains  or losses  in reserves  should  serve 
as "objective  indicators,"  or presumptive  criteria,  of the need for adjust- 
ment  and, in some cases,  for the application  of international  pressures  on 
countries  to bring  about such adjustment. 
Finally,  the U.S. proposal  stressed  the need  for consistency  between  the 
rules governing  the international  monetary  system  on the one hand and 
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States  made  no specific  proposal  on this issue, and little  further  work  has 
been done on harmonizing  the rules  of the IMF and the GATT (General 
Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade).  Nonetheless,  for reasons  pointed out 
earlier,  convertibility  obligations  can be viable  in the long run  only  if com- 
bined  with  an effective  adjustment  mechanism.  And no system  of monetary 
adjustment  can operate  effectively  if it is thwarted  by commercial  or invest- 
ment  policies  that distort  or rigidify  trade  and investment  relationships. 
In proposing  substantial  reductions  in the dominant  role of the U.S. 
dollar  and the United  States,  and  yet stopping  well short  of an automatic, 
self-disciplining  system,  the American  reform  proposal  clearly  implied  the 
need for stronger  international  institutions.  In the words of the Shultz 
statement,  "International  decision  making  will not be credible  or effective 
unless  it is carried  out by representatives  who clearly  carry  a high stature 
and  influence  in the councils  of their  own governments.  Our  international 
institutions  will  need  to reflect  that  reality...."8 The  Committee  of Twenty, 
a ministerial-level  body representing  the constituent  nations or nation- 
groups  of the IMF, was  formed  to develop  a blueprint  for a reformed  inter- 
national  monetary  system as a first step in this institutional  upgrading 
process. 
THE COMMITTEE OF TWENTY'S  OUTLINE  OF REFORM 
The Outline  of Reform produced  by the Committee  of Twenty  is in 
effect  two documents.9  Part  I is devoted  to a description  of "The  Reformed 
System"  which  in many of its essential  features  is very close to the U.S. 
proposal.  It reflects  the same relatively  conservative  view of the interna- 
tional monetary  system,  "with  the exchange  rate regime  based on stable 
but adjustable  par values  and with floating  rates  recognized  as providing 
a useful  technique  in particular  situations."  It indicates  a similar  concern 
for a more symmetrical  system,  citing among "the main features  of the 
international  monetary  reform"  "an effective  and symmetrical  adjustment 
process ...";  "the introduction  of an appropriate  form of convertibility 
8. IMF, Summary  Proceedings,  p. 42. 
9. International  Monetary  Fund, "Outline  of Reform,"  in International  Monetary  Re- 
form: Documents  of the Committee  of Twenty  (IMF, 1974),  pp. 7-48. The discussion  here 
is not a comprehensive  survey  of the reform  proposal,  but focuses only on those aspects 
relating  to the issue under  consideration.  In particular,  I omit any discussion  of one very 
important  aspect of international  monetary reform: the relation of the international 
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for  the  settlement of  imbalances, with  symmetrical obligations  on  all 
countries" (including those whose currencies are held in official reserves); 
and "better international management of global liquidity, with the SDR 
becoming the principal reserve asset and the role of gold and of reserve 
currencies being reduced."10 
The Committee of Twenty outline also echoes the U.S.  proposal in its 
concern for consistency within and among the various aspects of the re- 
formed system, citing also among the main features "consistency between 
arrangements for  adjustment, convertibility, and  global  liquidity" and 
pointing out that "it is agreed that the principles which govern the interna- 
tional monetary system and arrangements  in these related areas [of interna- 
tional trade, capital, investment, and development assistance] must be con- 
sistent." As regards capital movements, the outline notes more specifically 
the need for  cooperation  "in actions  designed to  limit disequilibrating 
capital flows and in arrangements  to finance and offset them." Finally, pro- 
vision is made for the necessary upgrading and strengthening of the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund in the form of a permanent council, with one 
member (at the ministerial level) from each Fund constituency, "to super- 
vise the management and adaptation of the monetary system, to  oversee 
the continuing operation of the adjustment  process, and to deal with sudden 
disturbances which might threaten the system."11 
Whereas the proposals for reform of the international monetary system 
put forth by the United States in September 1972 and by the Committee of 
Twenty in June 1974 were similar, the contexts in which they were prof- 
ferred were vastly different. The U.S.  proposal was offered at a time of 
widespread  commitment to the pattern of exchange rates established under 
the Smithsonian Agreement. The final report of the Committee of Twenty, 
on the other hand, came at a time when the Smithsonian Agreement had 
been consigned to history, when the world had had more than a year's 
experience with widespread floating of exchange rates, and when an early 
restoration of any par-value system was no longer a serious option. 
Part II of the Outline of Reform, entitled "Immediate Steps," focuses 
on criteria for a workable floating-rate system for the present, rather than 
on a fixed-rate system to be implemented in the far-off future, if at all. The 
two parts of the document are consistent in spirit, however. Both imply a 
larger and more influential  role for the IMF, particularly  in the surveillance 
10. Ibid., p. 8. 
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of the international  adjustment  mechanism,  including  such aspects of 
national  policy  as management  of the balance  of payments,  exchange  rates, 
and reserves.  Both depart  sharply  from a system  based on a key currency 
toward  one that embodies  equality  of obligations  and criteria  for conduct 
among  all currencies  as regards  adjustments,  asset  settlement,  and  reserves. 
And both reflect  a pervasive  concern  for consistency  among  all aspects  of 
the system  to minimize  the  likelihood  of offsetting  and  potentially  destructive 
behavior. 
This second  part of the proposal  provides,  in general  terms,  for close 
international  consultation  on and  IMF surveillance  of balance-of-payments 
adjustment.  The  Fund  is instructed  "to gain  further  experience  in the use of 
objective  indicators,  including  reserve  indicators,  on an experimental  basis" 
and to determine  "what  is a disproportionate  movement  in reserves.. 
in the  light  of the  broad  objectives  of member  countries  for  the  development 
of their  reserves  over a period  ahead  ....  "12  Of much greater  immediate 
importance  are the guidelines  for floating,  designed  as a code for central 
bank intervention  in exchange  markets.  The aim is to avoid competitive 
devaluation  or undervaluation  and to promote  international  consistency 
in what is clearly  expected  to be a system  of managed  rather  than freely 
flexible  exchange  rates. The proposed  guidelines  provide  that a country 
should  intervene  in the foreign  exchange  market  "to prevent  or moderate 
sharp  and disruptive"  day-to-day  or week-to-week  fluctuations  in the ex- 
change value of its currency-that is, to help maintain  orderly  market 
conditions.  They provide  also that a country  may intervene  to moderate 
month-to-month  or quarter-to-quarter  movements  in its exchange  rate, 
particularly  if "factors  recognized  to be temporary  are at work,"  although 
generally  speaking  a country  should  avoid  intervening  to accentuate  move- 
ments  in the value  of its currency.13 
As to longer-range  intervention,  the guidelines  for floating  lean heavily 
on the concept of a target  zone or range  for the exchange  rate and for 
reserves,  to be determined  jointly  by the country  concerned  and the Fund. 
Intervention  to move in the direction  of the reserve  target,  or to moderate 
movements  away  from  it, would  be encouraged,  while  intervention  having 
the opposite effects would be frowned  on. In the prominence  given to 
reserve  indicators  as a criterion  for judging  actions  to affect  balance-of- 
payments  adjustment,  the  guidelines  for  floating  look much  like  the original 
12. Ibid., p. 19. 
13. The guidelines,  including  the quotations,  are from ibid., Annex 4. Marina v. N.  Whitman  549 
U.S. proposal,  adapted  to a world  of managed  floats  rather  than of "fixed 
but adjustable"  parities. 
The outline of an interim  system  also calls for Fund surveillance  and 
management  of the supply  of global liquidity.  Such management  would 
involve  the allocation  (issuance)  and cancellation  of SDRs so as to ensure 
consistency  between  the determination  of global reserve  needs and other 
provisions  of the reform,  in particular  those for convertibility  and adjust- 
ment. Fund review  of the aggregate  volume  of foreign  exchange  reserves 
is called for, as are steps to secure  "orderly  reductions"  should reserves 
increase  excessively.  However,  the proposal  leaves  unsettled  the important 
question  of whether  asset settlement  should  be mandatory,  meaning  that 
all holdings  of currencies  in official  reserves  above  a predetermined  amount 
must  be converted  into primary  reserve  assets,  or "on demand,"  meaning 
that conversion  would  take place only if either  the holding  country  or the 
issuing  country  requested  it.14  Obviously,  a mandatory  scheme  would  entail 
much closer international  control over the aggregate  volume of inter- 
national  reserves. 
The outline  also notes the importance  of coordination  and consistency 
between  the monetary  and trading  systems,  and, especially,  of avoiding 
restrictions  on trade  and payments  for balance-of-payments  purposes.  To 
that end, there  is appended  to the Outline  of Reform  a declaration  whose 
signatories  would  pledge  themselves  not to introduce  or intensify  trade  or 
other  current-accou-nt  restrictions  for balance-of-payments  purposes  "with- 
out a prior  finding  by the Fund [of]  justification."15 
The  pressures  for symmetry  implicit  in the guidelines  for floating  and in 
the concept  of a mandatory  asset settlement  system  that would  reduce  or 
prevent  the accumulation  of currencies  in official  reserves  are  clear  enough. 
In addition,  the Committee  of Twenty  proposal,  by providing  for multi- 
currency  or SDR intervention,  would  at least  attenuate  the  role  of the  dollar 
as an intervention  currency,  with  its attendant  restrictions  on variations  in 
the exchange  value of the dollar.  The delineation  of such an alternative 
scheme  is complicated  by the fact that,  without  a passive,  nth  country,  pre- 
cise rules  of behavior  are  essential  to prevent  mutually  contradictory  inter- 
vention  by two or more  countries. 
Finally,  the outline  proposes  a new way of valuing  SDRs, in some pre- 
determined  combination  or "basket"  of leading  currencies,  rather  than in 
14. For a discussion  of the alternatives,  see ibid., Annex 5. 
15. Ibid., p. 23. 550  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1974 
terms  of dollars  or gold.  Of several  variants,  the one selected  for a two-year 
trial  is the so-called  "standard  basket"  technique.  Under  this scheme,  the 
appreciation  (depreciation)  of any currency  in the basket  in terms  of all 
other  currencies  would  raise  Oower)  the value of the SDR in terms  of all 
other  currencies.l6  The purpose  of a "basket"  SDR would  be to provide  a 
numeraire  that had stability  in terms of the average value of the major 
currencies  in a world where all currencies,  including  the dollar, moved 
freely  against  one another.  Implicit  in this concept  is the expectation  that, 
over  the long run,  such  a unit of account  would  also have greater  stability 
of worldwide  purchasing  power  than  any  individual  currency.  Correspond- 
ing to such  use of a basket  SDR is the measurement  of effective  changes  in 
exchange  rates,  computed  as an average  of changes  in individual  bilateral 
rates,  weighted  according  to trade  shares.  Such measures  have been used 
increasingly  since  the advent  of generalized  floating.17 
The United  States,  the Dollar,  and  the International  Monetary  System 
A few years  ago, a number  of American  academics  noted a certain  am- 
bivalence  in the attitude  of the European  countries  toward the United 
States  and the international  monetary  system.  On the one hand,  the Euro- 
peans  exerted  increasing  pressure  on the United States  to reduce  its pay- 
ments deficit  and "put its house in order."  At the same time, they were 
clearly  loath  to appreciate  currencies  that  were  undervalued  or  to undertake 
other  liberalizing  actions  to reduce  their own collective  payments  surplus 
which  was, in large  measure,  the counterpart  of the U.S. deficit. 
Today,  it is the  United  States  that  is displaying  ambivalence  and  a certain 
inconsistency  toward  its role in the international  monetary  system.  On the 
one  hand,  the  United  States  has  fought  hard-and apparently  successfully- 
for greater  symmetry  in the new system,  for an end to its unique  converti- 
16. Although  such  a fixed-weight  basket,  incorporating  the currencies  of the countries 
most important  in international  trade,  is reasonable  as an interim  measure,  presumably 
any permanent  scheme  would have to allow for changing  both the weights  and the com- 
position of the basket as the relative trading importance  of countries changed. The 
weighting  scheme  is detailed  in International  Monetary  Fund, IMF Survey,  Vol. 3 (June 
17, 1974),  p. 185. 
17. The calculations  of several  indexes  of effective  changes  in exchange  rates  are out- 
lined in Economic  Report  of the President,  February  1974, Supplement  to Chap. 6, pp. 
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bility  obligations,  for greater  freedom  to exercise  active  control  over  its own 
exchange  rate.  At the same  time, it seems  reluctant  to abolish  the special 
role of the dollar  as a reserve  currency.  For example,  the United  States  has 
opposed  a system  of mandatory  convertibility  of foreign  exchange  balances 
in favor of a looser system of convertibility  on demand, arguing  that 
countries  that prefer  to hold foreign  exchange  (primarily  dollars)  in their 
reserves  should  be free to do so unless  the issuer  of the reserve  currency 
objects.  Similarly,  discussing  a system  of managed  floating,  U.S. represen- 
tatives  have favored  "ceiling  intervention"  (under  which  countries  whose 
currencies  are appreciating  would purchase  weaker  currencies  to slow or 
halt  the appreciation)  over  "floor  intervention"  (countries  whose  currencies 
are  depreciating  would  sell stronger  currencies  for their  own).  Floor inter- 
vention  would hold down the creation  of foreign  exchange  reserves  and 
thus  enhance  collective  control  over  creation  of international  reserves.  Ceil- 
ing intervention,  on the other  hand, would  be associated  with acquisition 
of dollars  by countries  with strong  currencies  and thus tend to perpetuate 
the reserve-currency  role  of the dollar.  And yet, as Cooper  has pointed  out, 
even  the reserve  roles occupied  by the dollar  in the past have left a legacy 
of difficulties  for any system  based  on full symmetry  of rights  and obliga- 
tions. The continuation  of this reserve  role  into the future  would  greatly- 
perhaps  hopelessly-complicate  the operation  of a more  symmetrical  inter- 
national  monetary  system.18 
This ambivalence  on the part of the United States, it can be argued, 
reflects  uneven  changes  in its role in the world  economy.  In "real"  terms, 
the pattern  has been one of steady,  gradual  decline  from  the overwhelming 
dominance  the  United  States  exerted  immediately  after  World  War  II. Con- 
comitantly,  the sensitivity  of the  U.S. economy  to influences  beyond  its own 
borders  has increased  significantly,  although  the United States  is still far 
less open  than  other  countries  in the  noncommunist  world.  In the financial 
sphere,  on the other  hand,  the international  positions  of the United  States 
and of the dollar (which are not always identical)  have, if  anything, 
strengthened  throughout  most of the postwar  era. Any decline in their 
dominance  has occurred  only since  about 1970,  with  the final  crisis  of con- 
fidence  of the Bretton  Woods system  and the highly  fluid situation  since 
then.  At present  it is impossible  to tell whether  this rather  small  reduction 
18. Richard  N. Cooper, "Eurodollars,  Reserve  Dollars, and Asymmetries  in the In- 
ternational  Monetary  System,"  Journal  of International  Economics,  Vol. 2 (September 
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Table  1. The  U.S. Share  in the World  Economy,  Selected  Economic 
and  Financial  Measures,  1950, 1960,  1970,  and  1973 
Percent  of world total 
Measure  1950  1960  1970  1973 
Gross national  product  39  34  30  28 
Production  of motor vehicles  76  48  31  n.a. 
Production  of steel  46  28  20  n.a. 
International  reservesa  50  32  16  8 
Exports  16  15  14  120 
Consumption  of materialsb  42  n.a.  27  n.a. 
Sources: 1973-International Economic  Report of the President,  February  1974, pp. 2, 4, and International 
Monetary Fund, International  Financial Statistics, Vol. 27 (May 1974), pp. 18-19; materials consumption- 
Materials Needs and the Environment  Today and Tomorrow,  Final Report of the National Commission on 
Materials Policy (1973), Table 9.1, p. 9-4; other data are from Peter G. Peterson, The United States in the 
Changing  WorldEconomy,  Vol. 2, Background  Material(U.S. Government  Printing  Office, 1971),  Charts 1, 9, 
11, 12. 
a.  End of period. Includes gold, special drawing rights, reserve position in the International Monetary 
Fund, and foreign exchange. 
b.  Materials are here defined as natural resources intended to be used by industry for the production of 
goods,' except food. 
c.  1972 data. 
n.a. Not available. 
in the international  financial  role of the dollar is temporary  and will be 
halted  or reversed  once the international  monetary  system  settles  down to 
more predictable  behavior,  or whether  it marks  the first  stage of a signif- 
icant shift in the preferences  of participants  in international  markets. 
The United  States  in the World  Economy 
The  change  in the  real  position  of the  United  States  in the  world  economy 
since 1950  is summarized  briefly  in Table 1. While the United States  re- 
mained  the world's  largest  economy  in 1973,  with  a gross  national  product 
accounting  for nearly  half that of all countries  of the Organisation  for 
Economic  Co-operation  and Development  and running  more than three 
times  that of Japan,  the second  largest  noncommunist  country,19  its share 
of world  GNP had fallen by more than one-fourth  since 1950.  The U.S. 
shares  of world  exports  and  international  reserves  have  also  declined  stead- 
ily, the latter  much more dramatically  than the former.  Capital  exports 
have  behaved  differently.  In 1971,  as in 1961,  the United  States  held almost 
70 percent  of the  total  direct  investment  claims  of the  world's  major  capital- 
19. International  Economic  Report  of the  President,  February  1974, p. 2. Marina  v. N. Whitman  553 
exporting  nations,  despite  the introduction  from 1963  onward  of programs 
to retard  outflows  of U.S. capital.20 
Meanwhile,  the United States  has become  a more open economy  and 
more sensitive  to influences  from abroad.  The ratio of imports  to U.S. 
GNP has  grown  from  4.4 percent  in 1950  to 7.4 percent  in 1973,  paralleling 
the  share  of exports  (up  from  4.6 percent  to 7.8 percent),  despite  substantial 
swings  in the  U.S. trade  balance  during  the  period.21  The  openness  of other 
industrialized  nations also increased  substantially  during 1950-73. The 
point is that the United States is much more deeply involved in inter- 
dependence  as a two-way  proposition  than ever  before. 
The averages  just described  obscure  the much  heavier  dependence  of the 
U.S. economy  on other  countries  for critical  materials-especially  on the 
third  world  for natural  resources.  The resulting  influence  of the producing 
countries  on the U.S. economy  may well deepen  if they can imitate  the 
OPEC  countries  (those  in the Organisation  of Petroleum  Exporting  Coun- 
tries)  in exploiting  their  potential  oligopoly  power. 
The continuing,  albeit  reduced,  importance  of the United States  in the 
world  economy  combines  with  the greater  sensitivity  of the domestic  econ- 
omy to external  influences  to create  a channel  through  which  U.S. policies 
and experiences  have an extra,  indirect  impact on the U.S. economy  via 
their  effects  on the rest  of the world.  For example,  perhaps  one-quarter  of 
the 39 percent  increase  in the dollar  prices  of thirteen  major  industrial  raw 
materials  and slightly  less than one-fifth  of the 65 percent  increase  in the 
prices  of nine  foodstuffs  during  the first  three  quarters  of 1973  were  attrib- 
utable  to the depreciation  of the dollar over the same period.22  Clearly, 
these increases  contributed  substantially  to the general  increase  in U.S. 
prices.  Indeed,  recent  experience  makes  clear  that  predictions  of the impact 
that effective  depreciation  of the dollar  would  have on U.S. inflation  were 
far too low. These estimates  were generally  based on the conventional 
Keynesian  model, with elasticities  of substitution  between  foreign and 
20. International  Monetary  Fund, Balance  of Payments  Yearbook,  Vol. 17 (1960-64) 
and Vol. 25 (1968-72). 
21. Survey  of Current  Business,  Vol. 38 (December  1958),  p. 13, and Vol. 54 (October 
1974), p. S-1. 
22. Edward  M. Bernstein,  "The Inflation  Problem  in the United States," Quarterly 
Review  and  Investment  Survey,  Fourth Quarter  1973  (New York: Model, Roland & Co., 
1973), pp. 2-4.  These items are the components of the index of spot market prices 
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domestic  goods assumed  to be relatively  low. Under these assumptions, 
depreciation  of the dollar would affect the domestic price level only 
through  the higher prices of imported  finished  goods or inputs. Since 
imports  constitute  only some  7.4 percent  of U.S. GNP, an effective  dollar 
depreciation  of 10 percent  could raise  the price  level, as measured  by the 
GNP deflator,  by no more  than 3/4 of 1 percent.  Further,  the  relative  impor- 
tance of the United States in world markets  makes it unlikely  that the 
depreciation  would  be passed  through  fully  into  the  dollar  prices  of imports. 
In reality,  of course,  elasticities  of substitution  between  foreign  and do- 
mestic  goods  may  be quite  high  in certain  sectors,  and  realistic  estimates  of 
the  impact  of depreciation  on domestic  prices  must  be based  on models  that 
incorporate  its effects  on the  entire  tradable-goods  sector.  Although  system- 
atic evidence  is still scarce,  two studies  have  yielded  reasonably  consistent 
results.  One,  utilizing  regression  analysis  for the period  1959-71,  estimated 
that the U.S. consumer  price  index  would  rise by about  20 percent  of the 
effective  dollar  depreciation.23  The second estimated  that the 10 percent 
effective  depreciation  of the dollar  between  November  1972 and August 
1973 accounted  for between 1.9 and 2.3 percentage  points of the U.S. 
wholesale  inflation  over  that period.24 
These  studies  may still not capture  the total indirect  effects  on prices  in 
industries  producing  exportable  and  import-competing  goods  and,  through 
effects  on wages,  even  in sectors  producing  nontradable  output.  In partic- 
ular, the improvement  in the net balance on goods and services  from a 
deficit  of $0.8 billion in 1972:4 to a surplus  of $11.6 billion in 1973:4 
(both in 1958  dollars)  represented  38 percent  of the total increase  in real 
GNP over  the period.  When  key  industries  were  straining  against  capacity, 
this substantial  diversion  from domestic  to foreign  absorption  must have 
had  pervasive  effects  on the  domestic  price  level.  Clearly,  the  feedback  from 
the exchange  rate  of the dollar  to the U.S. price  level,  which  took many  by 
surprise  in 1973,  is too large  to be ignored. 
A similar,  if less dramatic,  feedback  can be observed  in domestic  corpo- 
rate  profits.  The  share  of foreign  earnings  in the  profits  of U.S. corporations 
23. Sung Y. Kwack, "The Effects of Foreign Inflation on Domestic Prices and the 
Relative  Price Advantage  of Exchange  Rate Changes"  (paper  presented  at the Confer- 
ence on Effects  of Exchange  Rate Adjustments,  U.S. Department  of the Treasury,  April 
5, 1974; processed). 
24. William Nordhaus and John Shoven, "Inflation 1973: The Year of Infamy," 
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Table  2. Share  of Foreign  Earnings  in Profits  of U.S. Corporations, 
Selected  Years,  1950-72 
Millions of dollars,  except as noted 
Profit 
calculation  1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1971  1972 
Total U.S. corporate 
profits before taxes  42,600  48,600  49,700  77,800  74,000  85,100  98,000 
U.S. direct investments 
abroad 
Earningsa  1,769  2,811  3,566  5,460  8,789  10,299  12, 386p 
Interest, dividends, and 
branch earnings of 
U.S. investorsb  1,294  1,912  2,355  3,963  6,001  7,295  8,004p 
Percent of total U.S. 
corporate  profits 
Foreign earnings  4.2  5.8  7.2  7.0  11.9  12.1  12.6 
Interest, dividends, and 
branch earnings of 
U.S. investors  3.0  3.9  4.7  5.1  8.1  8.6  8.2 
Sources: Profits-U.S.  Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United  States, 1974 (1974), Table 
802, p. 488; other data-Survey  of Current  Business, various issues. 
a.  U.S. parents'  share in the earnings of their foreign subsidiaries  and branches, after payment of foreign 
income tax, preferred  dividends, and interest. 
b.  The sum of dividends, preferred  dividends, and interest received by or credited to the account of U.S. 
direct investors-all  net of foreign withholding taxes-plus  branch earnings after foreign taxes; all before 
U.S. taxes. 
p  Prelimninary. 
has roughly  tripled  from 1950  to 1972  (see Table  2). At the same  time, the 
share  of sales  of local affiliates  of U.S. firms  in the GNP of such  important 
partner  countries  as Canada,  the United  Kingdom,  Germany,  and France 
has been increasing  steadily.25  The circular  flow from developments  here 
through  U.S. affiliates  to other  economies  and  then  back  again  through  the 
earnings  of those affiliates  to U.S. corporate  profits  plainly  has growing 
significance  for real economic  activity  in the United States. 
The  International  Financial  Roles  of the Dollar 
While  on the real  side  the relative  importance  of the United  States  in the 
world  economy  has been declining  gradually  over the postwar  period,  the 
role  of the U.S. dollar  in international  financial  transactions  has expanded, 
at times  dramatically.  Even  the major  upheavals  in international  financial 
25. See Implications  of Multinational  Firms  for World  Trade  and Investment  and  for 
U.S. Trade  and Labor,  Report to the Senate Committee  on Finance, 93 Cong. 1 sess. 
(1973); and Organisation  for Economic Co-operation  and Development,  National  Ac- 
counts  of OECD Countries,  1960-1971  (Paris: OECD, no date). 556  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
markets  in the  past  few  years  have  not yet significantly  affected  the  financial 
importance  of the dollar,  and may not in the future. 
A quick  overview  of the international  financial  role of the dollar  can be 
gleaned  from  Table  3, which  depicts  the international  liquidity  position  of 
the United  States  since 1957.  Between  1957  and 1970  the deterioration  in 
the U.S. net liquidity  position  was gradual  enough  to be attributable  pri- 
marily  to the expanding  international  banking  or intermediation  function 
that the United States performed  as the major supplier  of private  and 
official  international  reserves.  From 1970  on, when  the U.S. liquidity  posi- 
tion  vis-a-vis  commercial  banks  actually  improved  and  the  accelerated  over- 
all deterioration  was due entirely  to the explosion  in liquid liabilities  to 
foreign  official  institutions,  the change  is more  reasonably  interpreted  as a 
weakening  of the international  position  of the dollar. 
Table  3 indicates  that as of the end of 1973,  the total liquid  claims  on 
U.S. residents  held by foreigners,  both private  and official,  amounted  to 
slightly  more than $90 billion.  But this figure  tells only part of the story. 
As of the same  date,  the net size  of the Eurocurrency  market  was  estimated 
to be $155  billion,  of which  some  72 percent,  or $112  billion,  was  in Euro- 
dollars.  Thus, a total of some $200 billion of liquid dollar-denominated 
assets  was held by foreigners  at the end of 1973,  as compared  with $100 
billion  in 1970  and $40 billion  in 1965. 
Actually,  the numbers,  while  useful  in suggesting  the general  magnitude 
of the phenomenon,  obscure  the multiple  roles  the dollar  plays.  As many 
as six separate  functions  of an international  "key"  or "vehicle"  currency 
have been identified:  the transactions,  quotation,  and asset-currency  roles 
in private  transactions,  and-in  rough  correspondence-the  intervention, 
unit-of-account,  and reserve-currency  roles in official  transactions.26  Al- 
though  these  roles  are logically  distinct,  efficiency  is likely  to be enhanced 
by combining  them. The dollar does, in fact, function  in all six aspects; 
and  I consider  each  in evaluating  the past,  present,  and  future  of the dollar 
in the international  monetary  system. 
THE  DOLLAR'S  ROLE IN  PRIVATE  TRANSACTIONS 
In delineating  the international  roles  played  by the dollar,  distinguishing 
the transactions  from  the asset  functions  is difficult,  since  there  is no effec- 
26. Benjamin  J. Cohen, The Future of Sterling as an International  Currency  (St. 
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tive  means  of estimating  the portions  of liquid  balances  held  for each  pur- 
pose. For gauging  the dollar's  role in international  trade  transactions,  the 
general  identity  of the quotation  or invoice  currency  with the currency  of 
settlement  proves  useful. 
For the period  1968-71,  somewhere  between  one-quarter  and one-third 
of world  trade  is thought  to have  been  invoiced  and  transacted  in dollars.27 
Although  the U.S. share  of world  trade  is substantial  (15 percent  in 1970), 
the  much  larger  estimated  share  of the dollar  in trade  transactions  indicates 
that  it also  plays  a significant  "third  currency"  role  in transactions  in which 
no U.S. resident  is involved.  One rough  estimate  indicates  that about 75 
percent  of transactions  in third-country  currencies  are  denominated  in dol- 
lars,  with  the pound  sterling  serving  as the only other  major  third-country 
currency.28  Unfortunately,  no systematic  evidence  is available  to indicate 
whether  this  role  of the  dollar  has  altered  significantly  in recent  years.  There 
are anecdotal  reports  of shifts  away  from dollar  invoicing  since 1971,  but 
few'  hard  numbers.  A study  based  on U.S. customs  data  found  that, while 
the proportion  of U.S. imports  from Germany  invoiced in dollars had 
decreased  and  the  proportion  invoiced  in Deutsche  marks  increased  between 
1971 and 1973,  the proportion  of U.S. imports  from Japan  invoiced in 
dollars  had increased.29 
In discussing  the growth  of liquid  dollar  assets  held by nonofficial  for- 
eigners,  one must  distinguish  American  dollar  holdings  that are direct  lia- 
bilities  of U.S. residents  from Eurodollar  holdings  that, although  denom- 
inated  in dollars,  are held outside  the United States  and are liabilities  of 
foreign  rather  than  domestic  residents.  Most of the growth  in recent  years 
of dollar-denominated  assets  held  by nonofficial  foreigners  has been  in the 
latter  form. 
The  liquid  American  dollar  holdings  of foreign  private  nonbanks  ("other 
foreigners"  in Table 3), for example,  increased  by only 130 percent  over 
the period 1957-73, while U.S. trade increased  by some 300 percent  in 
nominal value, world trade by 400 percent,  and international  financial 
transactions  arising  from dollar-denominated  capital  movements  by even 
27. Cohen, Future  of Sterling,  p. 18; and Sven Grassman,  "A Fundamental  Sym- 
metry in International  Payment Patterns,"  Journal  of International  Economics,  Vol. 3 
(May 1973),  pp. 115-16. 
28. Ibid., p. 110. Grassman's  estimates  are extrapolated  from Swedish  data for 1968, 
reinforced  by observations  for Denmark  and West Germany. 
29. Stephen  P. Magee,  "U.S. Import  Prices  in the Currency-Contract  Period,"  Brook- 
ings  Papers  on Economic  Activity  (1:1974), Table 2, pp. 126-27. 00  .o  .  *  m  C 
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greater  proportions.  Since  such  claims,  consisting  primarily  of demand  and 
short-term  time deposits  in U.S. banks,  are  generally  held for transactions 
rather  than  investment  purposes,  their  slow  rise  suggests  that  the growth  of 
multinational  banks  and  nonfinancial  corporations,  as  well  as  the  expansion 
of Eurodollar  deposits,  may well have  reduced  the demand  for short-term 
deposits  in the United  States.30  In any  case,  the diminishing  importance  of 
such holdings relative  to international  transactions  was an established 
trend  long before  the decline  and fall of the Bretton  Woods system;  and, 
in fact, such  balances  actually  spurted  upward  in 1972  and 1973,  a time of 
maximum  fluctuation  and uncertainty  for the dollar  in foreign  exchange 
markets. 
The liquid  holdings  of American  dollar  balances  by foreign  commercial 
banks  grew  fairly  steadily  until 1969,  and since  that time, as indicated  in 
Table 3, have fluctuated  substantially  without any discernible  trend. A 
large  proportion  of these assets  represents  the internal  accounting  entries 
of multinational  banks, particularly  U.S. commercial  bank borrowings 
from and repayments  to the Eurodollar  market through their foreign 
branches.  For this  reason,  "it  is impossible  to determine  either  the amounts 
of foreign  liquid  dollar  balances  which  serve  an international  transactions 
function  or the amounts  which  represent  the American  dollar  asset com- 
ponents of the liquid interest-earning  portfolios of foreign commercial 
banks."3' 
In contrast  to the relatively  modest  growth  of foreign  private  holdings  of 
American  dollar balances over the past decade, Eurodollar  holdings- 
dollar-denominated  deposits  held in banks  outside  the United States,  pri- 
marily  in London-have grown  explosively  since 1964.  This market  owes 
its development  partly  to U.S. monetary  policy,  in particular  to the imposi- 
tion in 1964  of controls  on capital  outflows,  and partly  to the worldwide 
expansion  of the U.S. banking  system.  To what  extent  Eurodollar  deposits 
reflect  a specific  demand  for dollar liquidity  is unclear;  but there are a 
number  of reasons  for regarding  them  as primarily  a substitute  for foreign 
holdings  of American  liquid  dollar  assets.32 
Although official  (mainly  central  bank) holdings of Eurodollars  have 
30. Raymond F. Mikesell  and J. Herbert  Furth, Foreign  Dollar Balances  and the In- 
ternational  Role of the Dollar (Columbia  University  Press for the National Bureau of 
Economic  Research,  1974),  p. 17. 
31. Ibid., p. 86. 
32. See ibid., pp. 29-30, for discussion  of this point. Marina  v. N. Whitman  561 
grown  substantially  in recent  years  and have  acquired  considerable  signifi- 
cance  in the international  monetary  system,  private  holdings  still account 
for  the  bulk  of the  Eurodollar  market.  Actually,  this  market  operates  at two 
levels:  an interbank  market  based  largely  on interest  arbitrage,  similar  to 
the  federal  funds  market  in the United  States,  and  a market  involving  non- 
bank  depositors  and  borrowers.  Data on the "gross"  size  of the Eurodollar 
market  reflect  operations  on both levels, while figures  representing  the 
"net"  size are adjusted  to exclude  the double-counting  that results  from 
interbank  redepositing.  Finally,  neither  "Euro"  nor "dollar"  is an accurate 
designation  of the  phenomenon.  The  dollar  is only  one  of several  currencies, 
albeit  the major  one, in which  such  external  deposits  are  denominated  and, 
furthermore,  "the  dollar  and nondollar  components  of the Eurocurrency 
market  are in effect  all part  of the same  market."33  Nor is the market  any 
longer  entirely  European;  in recent  years  banks outside  Europe  have be- 
come significant  participants. 
As Table 4 indicates,  the Eurocurrency  market,  whether  measured  in 
gross or in net terms,  has been growing  at a rapid  and accelerating  pace 
since 1964,  with a particularly  large spurt  since 1971.  By the end of 1973 
the $155 billion of net Eurocurrency  deposits  was larger  than the money 
supply of any country  except the United States (although  they are not 
counted  in the money supply of any country).  Far from inhibiting  this 
expansion,  the upheavals  in foreign exchange  markets  since 1971 have 
spurred  it. In fact, in 1971  and again  in 1973,  Eurodollars  were  borrowed 
in substantial  amounts  to acquire  European  currencies  in anticipation  of 
exchange  rate  revaluations-that  is, to speculate  against the dollar!  In mid- 
1974,  however,  the growth  of the Eurocurrency  market  came  to an abrupt 
halt; and the market  actually  shrank  slightly  in the third quarter.  The 
reasons  for this retrenchment  were apparently  threefold:  a weakening  of 
confidence  in the banking  system  in the wake of several  widely  publicized 
bank  failures;  concern  on the part of the banks themselves  about basing 
longer-term  loans on short-term  and possibly  volatile  deposits,  many of 
them  originating  in the oil revenues  of the OPEC  countries;  and  some  shift 
in the  flow  of OPEC  funds  away  from  the  Eurocurrency  market  into various 
national  money  markets. 
Probably  more relevant  to the international  position  of the dollar  than 
the absolute  size  and growth  of the Eurocurrency  market  is the proportion 
33. Ibid., p. 28. 562  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
Table  4. Estimated  Size of the Eurocurrency  Market  in Thirteen 
Countries,  1964-74a 
Size of Eurocurrency  market- 
(billions  of dollars) 
Eurodollars  as percent 
Yearb  Gross  Net  of net market 
1964  20  14  83 
1965  24  17  84 
1966  29  21  83 
1967  36  25  84 
1968  50  34  82 
1969  85  50  84 
1970  110  65  81 
1971  145  80  76 
1972  195  105  78 
1973  295  155  72 
1974  330  170  75d 
Sources: Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, World  Financial Markets, July 16, 1974, p. 4' 
except the last column, 1964-73, which is from private correspondence  with Morgan Guaranty Trust Com- 
pany, June 4, 1974. 
a.  The thirteen  countries, which represent  the principal  Eurocurrency  market centers, are West Germany, 
France, Italy,  United  Kingdom,  Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden,  Bahamas, 
Canada, Japan, and Singapore. These estimates are more inclusive than those of the Bank for International 
Settlements, which are based on the Eurocurrency  business of banks only in the nine European countries 
listed. 
b.  Data are for the end of the period, except 1974, which is for March. 
c. Gross amounts include a market based on interest arbitrage  and one involving nonbank depositors and 
borrowers. Net amounts are adjusted to exclude double-counting from interbank redepositing. 
d. Percent of gross liabilities (approximation). 
of that market  accounted  for by dollars.  After  maintaining  a steady  share 
of between  82 and 84 percent  from 1964  to 1969,  the dollar component 
declined  to about 72 percent  at the end of 1973,  recovering  to 75 percent 
in the first  quarter  of 1974.  The  most  important  nondollar  currencies  in the 
market  were  the Deutsche  mark,  which  accounted  for more than half the 
nondollar  share  at the end of 1973,  and the Swiss  franc,  which  accounted 
for a third.34 
Three  factors  relating  to the international  monetary  system  apparently 
accounted  for the declining  share  of the dollar  in the Eurocurrency  market. 
One  is simply  the arithmetic  of the dollar  depreciations  of 1971  and 1973; 
in the latter  year,  "roughly  $10  billion  and $5 billion  of the increases  in the 
estimated  gross  and  net non-dollar  components,  respectively,  simply  reflect 
increases  in the dollar equivalent  of deposits  in these currencies  due to 
34. Morgan  Guaranty  Trust  Company  of New York, World  Financial  Markets,  April 
23, 1974, p. 8. Marina v. N.  Whitman  563 
exchange-rate  changes."  The proliferation  of "exchange  restrictions  and 
capital  controls  against  the placement  of funds  by foreigners  in European 
domestic  markets"  also stimulated  the rapid  expansion  of nondollar  Euro- 
currency  liabilities.35  Finally,  some  diversification  of both assets  and  liabil- 
ities  doubtless  resulted  from  efforts  of participants  in international  markets 
to hedge  against  exchange  rate  changes  between  the dollar  and  other  major 
currencies. 
A little  more  than  a decade  ago, Charles  Kindleberger  suggested  that  the 
integration  of long-term  capital  markets  in Europe  was  taking  place  not di- 
rectly  but  indirectly,  via  the  United  States.36  He predicted,  further,  that this 
trend would continue,  but with the Euromarket  taking  the place of the 
New York bond market.  This is precisely  what has happened.  The intro- 
duction  of U.S. capital  controls  in 1964  closed the New York market  to 
most foreign  borrowers,  but the then-embryonic  Eurobond  market  offered 
an alternative  source  of dollar-denominated  bonds.  Although  dwarfed  by 
the Eurocurrency  market,  total Eurobond  issues expanded  substantially, 
if irregularly,  from $1.7 billion in 1966  to $6.3 billion in 1972.  In 1973, 
under  the pressure  of high  interest  rates,  proliferating  capital  controls,  and 
general  uncertainty,  Eurobond  issues shrank  substantially,  with much of 
the activity  shifting  into longer-term  Eurobank  credits.  These  trends  con- 
tinued  into early 1974,  against  the background  of elimination  of the U.S. 
capital  controls  and  substantial  liberalization  of those  in other  major  coun- 
tries.  After  mid-1974,  however,  the volume  of longer-term  Eurocredits  also 
declined,  for reasons  described  earlier. 
As is the case with the Eurocurrency  market,  the dollar is the major 
currency  of denomination  for Eurobonds  but, again, the dollar-denomi- 
nated  portion  has diminished  since 1967,  as indicated  in the last two lines 
of Table  5. Concomitantly,  the shares  of the Deutsche  mark  and the Swiss 
franc  in Eurobond  issues  have increased  substantially. 
A general  overview  of changes  in the  composition  of world  private  liquid- 
ity between  1964  and 1973  is given  in Table  6, although  the data on Euro- 
currencies  there  are  less comprehensive  than  those  in Table  4.37 The share 
35. Ibid. 
36. Charles  P. Kindleberger,  "European  Economic  Integration  and the Development 
of a Single Financial  Center  for Long-Term  Capital," Weltwirtschaftliches  Archiv,  Vol. 
90 (July 1963), pp. 189-210. 
37. The International  Monetary  Fund, like the Bank for International  Settlements, 
bases its estimates on the Eurocurrency  business of banks only in the nine European 
countries  listed in note a to Table 4. tn  Y 00 t  ?  0  0en  t 
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of world  private  liquidity  accounted  for by direct  liabilities  of U.S. resi- 
dents,  which  ranged  between  39 and  45 percent  during  1964-69,  fell sharply 
thereafter;  meanwhile,  the share of liquid Eurodollar  assets  rose as they 
were  substituted  for liquid  American  dollar  assets.  As long as the absolute 
amount of liquid liabilities  of U.S. residents  rose, so did the combined 
share  of American  and Eurodollar  liabilities.  After 1969,  when  direct  U.S. 
liabilities  declined  in absolute  as well as relative  terms,  the share  of total 
dollar-denominated  liabilities  also  dropped.  While  this  shifting  composition 
of private  international  liquidity  was due initially  to repayments  by U.S. 
banks  of large  borrowings  from their  foreign  branches  in 1968-69,  it also 
came  to reflect  the monetary  events  since 1970,  which  weakened  confidence 
in the dollar  and  evoked  new  interest  in strong  European  currencies.  None- 
theless,  dollar-denominated  assets  still accounted  for nearly  three-fourths 
of total private  liquidity  in 1973. 
THE DOLLAR'S  ROLE IN  OFFICIAL  TRANSACTIONS 
In the official-as opposed  to the private-aspects of its key currency 
role,  the dollar  remained  essentially  unchallenged  throughout  the life of the 
Bretton  Woods system.  It was the unit of account  in which  the par values 
of the currencies  of all IMF member  countries  were  defined.  True,  because 
the yardstick  was  not simply  the U.S. dollar  but  the "gold  dollar"-that is, 
a dollar  of a given gold content-there was an inherent  ambiguity  in the 
numeraire.38  But  not until  the gold content  of the dollar  was altered  in the 
Smithsonian  Agreement  did this aspect  of the dollar's  role  come  into ques- 
tion. With the exception of a few countries  that maintained  the long- 
standing  post-colonial  relationships  of the sterling  area  and  the franc  zone, 
the dollar  was also the universal  instrument  of exchange  market  interven- 
tion. Finally, it was the predominant  reserve  currency  and the primary 
source  of international  reserve  growth. 
The erosion  of the dollar  as a unit of account  began  gradually  after  the 
events of mid-1971.  The concept of effective  changes  in exchange  rates, 
defined  not simply  in terms  of the dollar  but in terms  of a trade-weighted 
average  of partner  countries'  currencies,  was introduced  into the inter- 
38. Article  IV of the Articles  of Agreement  of the International  Monetary  Fund stipu- 
lates  that  par  values  are  to be expressed  "in terms  of gold as a common  denominator  or in 
terms  of the United States dollar of the weight and fineness  in effect on July 1, 1944." Marina v. Ar. Whitman  567 
national  lexicon. Symbolically,  the International  Monetary  Fund, which 
had always  defined  par values in terms of U.S. dollars  (as well as gold 
content),  began in June 1972  to express  them also in units per SDR; at 
about  the same  time,  it also  began  valuing  reserve  holdings  and  other  finan- 
cial data  in SDRs. But, as long as the SDR was defined  solely  in terms  of 
monetary  gold,  it was  an unwieldy  and  awkward  yardstick.  It was  not until 
the  interim  agreement  of June  1974,  adopting  the standard-basket  technique 
for the valuation  of the SDR (described  above)  that a genuine  alternative 
to the dollar  as the international  unit of account  became  available.39 
The first  serious  challenge  to the dollar's  virtually  exclusive  position  as 
an intervention  currency  came  as part  of the efforts  by the European  Eco- 
nomic Community  at monetary  integration.  In order  to implement  the 
so-called  "snake-in-the-tunnel"  policy, introduced  early  in 1972,  to halve 
the permitted  range of variation  between  any two EEC currencies,  the 
community  introduced  a complex  system of multicurrency  intervention. 
Although  the total amount of official  intervention  in exchange  markets 
since the advent  of floating  rates  has been substantial-for March 1973- 
March  1974  it was  estimated  at more  than $35  billion,  probably  surpassing 
the amount in any similar  period under fixed rates40-how much of it 
was  in forms  other  than  traditional  dollar  intervention  is not known.  Prob- 
ably the relative  importance  of nondollar  intervention  and the number  of 
countries  participating  in the EEC snake  are directly  related.  If so, non- 
dollar  intervention  must have begun  to erode  very shortly  after  it began. 
Great  Britain  was the first  casualty,  dropping  out of the snake  at the time 
of the sterling  crisis  in June 1972.  Italy  followed  in February  1973,  and a 
year  later  so did France,  leaving  only Germany  and six smaller  countries 
as participants  in the  joint float  and  the multicurrency  intervention  system. 
Despite  the alternatives  to dollar  intervention  offered  by the Committee 
of Twenty,  and  discussed  above,  the sparse  indirect  evidence  indicates  that 
any  reduction  in the  dollar's  position  as the  universal  intervention  currency 
has been at most marginal.  Any alternative  system,  furthermore,  would 
39. For a discussion  of how the value of the SDR is to be calculated  under  the new 
system  and a listing of the sixteen  countries  included  in the basket  and their  weights,  see 
IMF Survey  (June 17, 1974),  pp. 177, 185.  The weight  of the dollar  in the SDR basket- 
33 percent-far exceeds  the average  U.S. share  of world exports  in 1968-72. This excess 
reflects  the continued  importance  of the dollar  in nontrade  transactions. 
40. Richard  A. Debs, "Inflation  and the Economic  Outlook,"  Federal  Reserve  Bank 
of New York, Monthly  Review,  Vol. 56 (April 1974),  p. 87. 568  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
have to overcome  the very substantial  margin  of efficiency,  convenience, 
and simplicity  enjoyed  by the mechanism  of dollar  intervention.41 
The U.S. dollar  has dominated  international  reserve  growth  throughout 
the postwar  period.  Eighty  percent  of the growth  since 1950  has been in 
the foreign  exchange  component,  and most of this is in dollars.  Further- 
more, during  the "reserve  explosion"  of 1970-72, when world reserves 
roughly  doubled,  nearly  two-thirds  of the increase  was  in the form  of direct 
official  claims  on the United  States  (see  Table  7). During  this  period,  dollar 
reserve  holdings  became  more  a function  of supply  than  of demand;  much 
of the rise  in central  bank  holdings  of dollars  was doubtless  undesired,  at 
least  by the major  surplus  countries,  and reflected  the accelerating  deterio- 
ration  of the U.S. international  payments  position.  This was an important 
change.  Despite  protestations  to the contrary,  official  dollar  holdings  were 
probably  largely  voluntary  until  the end of 1969;  as late as the second  half 
of that year,  in fact, Germany  and several  other  European  countries  sold 
gold to the United States to replenish  dollar reserves  drawn down by 
borrowings  of U.S. commercial  banks  from  the Eurodollar  market.42 
The reserve  explosion  slowed  dramatically  in 1973,  despite  the fact that 
"there  is not as yet any statistical  evidence  of a reduction  in the utilization 
of reserves  by countries  that have allowed their currencies  to float."43 
Furthermore,  although  direct  claims on the United States remained  the 
single  most important  source  of change  in 1973,  their  importance  dimin- 
ished  substantially,  accounting  for less than one-third  of total additions  to 
reserves  from transactions  (that is, excluding  valuation  changes).  In addi- 
tion, the importance  of dollar-denominated  assets in total reserves  was 
reduced  by the devaluations  of the dollar  against  SDRs in 1971  and 1973 
(see the line "correction  for effect  of valuation"  in Table  7). 
Although  direct  claims  on the United States  are still the largest  single 
form  of official  reserves  and  account  for more  than  half of official  holdings 
of foreign  exchange,  their  share  is shrinking  with  the trend  toward  diversi- 
fication  of reserve  holdings,  particularly  into Eurodollars.  Identified  Euro- 
dollar  holdings  represented  almost  two-fifths  of foreign  exchange  holdings 
other  than  direct  claims  on the United  States  at the end of 1973,  and "this 
41. For a discussion of the advantages  of dollar intervention,  see F. Boyer de la 
Giroday,  Myths  and  Reality  in the  Development  of International  Monetary  Affairs,  Essays 
in International  Finance  105  (Princeton  University,  International  Finance  Section,  1974). 
42. Mikesell  and Furth, Foreign  Dollar Balances,  p. 94. 
43. International  Monetary  Fund, Annual  Report  of the Executive  Directors  for the 
Fiscal Year  Ended  April  30, 1974, p. 39. f ~  ~  ~  0  en  .N  0.  0.  C" 0  ^oXX 
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proportion  could actually  be much  higher,  depending  on [the  assumption 
made  about]  what  part  of the  unidentified  residual  ...  may  consist  of Euro- 
dollar  holdings."44  This means  that dollar-denominated  assets  accounted 
for a minimum  of 73 percent  of all foreign  exchange  reserve  holdings  as of 
the end of 1973,  and for at least 48 percent  of international  reserves  in all 
forms. 
Most of the growth  of nondollar  foreign  exchange  reserves  has been in 
the "new"  or nontraditional  reserve  currencies,  primarily  the Deutsche 
mark.  IMF staff estimates  indicate  that the share  of such currencies  "in- 
creased  from  5 per  cent or 6 per  cent  in 1964  to about  double  that figure  at 
the  time  of the advent  of widespread  floating.  The  percentage  increased  by a 
further  4 per cent or so during  the remainder  of 1973,  which  represents  an 
acceleration  in the rate at which  reserves  were  diversified."45  The data in 
Table  7 show that such holdings  may have equaled  as much  as SDR 22.6 
billion, or 22 percent  of total foreign  exchange  reserve  holdings,  at the 
end of 1973.46 
Despite the more rapid diversification  of recent  years, dollar-denomi- 
nated assets remain dominant  in international  reserves.  Diversification 
appears  to be the logical concomitant  of a tendency  for countries  to base 
their  exchange  rate  policies  on effective  rather  than dollar  exchange  rates, 
and would undoubtedly  be stimulated  by the wide adoption  of multicur- 
rency intervention  like that described  in the Outline  of Reform.  At the 
same  time, "exchange  rate  flexibility  is likely  to decrease  countries'  ability 
to diversify their foreign exchange holdings in the short run....  ."47  Thus, 
the full extent  of countries'  desires  to shift  the composition  of their  reserves 
away  from  dollar  assets  into those  denominated  in other  currencies  or in a 
composite  unit of account  such as the SDR remains  to be seen. 
The  Key Currency  Characteristics  of the Dollar 
The probable  future  role of the dollar  as a key currency  depends  on (1) 
the characteristics  desirable  in a vehicle  currency;  (2) the extent  to which 
44. Ibid., p. 36. Also see Table 7 above. 
45. John Williamson, "Increased  Flexibility and International  Liquidity" (paper 
presented  at the Williamsburg  Conference  of the Birgenstock Group, May 1974; pro- 
cessed),  p. 11. 
46. This figure is an upper limit inasmuch  as it assumes that none of the residual 
amount shown in the table is denominated  in dollars or pounds sterling. 
47. Williamson,  "Increased  Flexibility,"  p. 11. Marina  v. N. Whitman  571 
the U.S. dollar  has-and  will have-these characteristics;  and (3) possible 
alternatives  to the dollar. 
The characteristics  that determine  the desirability  of a vehicle  currency 
fall into two broad  groups:  those relating  to its convenience  for exchange 
or transactions  and those affecting  stability of asset value, or "capital 
certainty."48  A currency  possesses  exchange  convenience  when  it is broadly 
acceptable  and its use incurs  low transactions  costs. These  characteristics 
depend  largely on the economic  size of the issuing country;  the depth, 
breadth,  and resiliency  of its domestic  capital  markets;  and the absence  of 
trade  and exchange  controls.  By affecting  the liquidity  of a currency,  these 
characteristics  also influence  its capital  certainty.  But capital  certainty  de- 
pends  more  fundamentally  on the maintenance  of international  purchasing 
power-that  is,  stability  relative  to  some  average price level  of  other 
currencies.49 
In terms  of transactions  convenience,  the dollar  remains  about as ap- 
pealing  as it was  throughout  the Bretton  Woods  period.  The United  States 
still accounts  for the largest  single share of international  trade and the 
dollar  continues  to be the most important  currency  in invoicing  of foreign 
trade. Furthermore,  if anything,  the role of the United States  in capital 
transactions  appears  to have  expanded.  Although  the domestic  money  sup- 
plies  of many  leading  industrialized  countries  have  grown  faster  than  that  of 
the United  States  in recent  years,  the stock  of U.S. dollars  and  Eurodollars 
combined  has more than kept pace with the stocks of other major  cur- 
rencies. Finally, the U.S. market for domestic securities  is still much 
broader  than any other. The total (dollar equivalent)  value of security 
issues  in the U.S. market  in the early 1970s  was several  times as large as 
the total in the next two most important  domestic  markets,  those  in Japan 
(where transactions  by foreigners  are severely  restricted)  and in West 
Germany.50 
These  characteristics  of the dollar  should,  according  to economic  theory, 
be reflected  in the foreign  exchange  market:  relative  to other currencies, 
the dollar  should  account  for more  foreign  exchange  business;  the volume 
of dollars  that  can be traded  against  a particular  currency  without  affecting 
quoted  rates  should  be greater;  the spread  between  buying  and  selling  rates 
48. See, in addition  to Cohen, Future of Sterling, Alexander Swoboda, "Vehicle 
Currencies  and the Foreign Exchange  Market:  The Case of the Dollar," in Robert Z. 
Aliber (ed.), The  International  Market  for Foreign  Exchange  (Praeger,  1969), pp. 30-40. 
49. Ibid., p. 34. 
50. Organisation  for Economic Co-operation  and Development,  Financial  Statistics, 
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Table 8.  Changes in Effective  Exchange Rates for Major Currencies, 
Selected Periods, 1971-74a 
Percent,  based on pre-June  1970 parities 
Dec. 18, 1971-  July 6, 1973-  Jan. 23, 1974- 
Currency  July 6, 1973  Jan. 23, 1974  May 13, 1974 
U.S. dollar  -12.10  11.39  -8.93 
Canadian  dollar  -3.20  4.35  0.57 
Japanese  yen  9.91  -11.09  5.76 
British  pound  -19.74  -2.55  -0.13 
German  mark  19.01  -6.92  6.60 
French  franc  6.15  -10.66  -4.69 
Italian  lira  -24.93  5.40  -4.04 
Dutch guilder  1.75  2.76  4.12 
Belgian  franc  2.20  -2.98  3.77 
Swiss franc  16.14  -4.98  6.26 
Sources: Columns 1 and 2-Morgan  Guaranty Trust Company of New York,  World  Financial Markets, 
April 23, 1974,  p. 2; Column 3-calculated  from daily data sheets issued by Morgan Guaranty  Trust  Company 
during the period January 23 to May 13, 1974. 
a.  Percentage  exchange rate changes vis-&-vis  a group of fourteen major countries, weighted according to 
bilateral trade. 
should be narrower  for dollars;  brokers'  fees should be lower for dollar 
transactions;  and forward  contracts  should  be easier  to arrange  in dollars. 
Writing  in the late sixties, Swoboda  collected  quantitative  evidence  that 
supported  these points;5'  and piecemeal  and impressionistic  evidence  on 
the current  functioning  of the foreign  exchange  markets  indicates  that  they 
still hold true.52  With  the abolition  early  in 1974  of U.S. capital  controls, 
the dollar  became  the only major  currency  free of any form of exchange 
controls,  a development  that  enhanced  its exchange  convenience  relative  to 
other  currencies. 
On the other  hand,  the dollar  has lost some of its appeal  as a guarantor 
of asset  certainty.  Under  the Bretton  Woods  system,  the dollar  was  the best 
available  store of purchasing  power  over  foreign  exchange  in general,  for 
two major reasons.  First, its potential  fluctuation  around  parity  against 
another  currency  was only half as wide as that involving  two nondollar 
currencies.  Second,  because  of the nth-country  role, a change  in its parity 
was viewed  as much  less likely  than changes  for other  currencies. 
51. Swoboda, "Vehicle  Currencies,"  pp. 35-39. 
52. See How Well Are Fluctuating  Exchange  Rates Working?  Hearings before the 
Subcommittee  on International  Economics  of the Joint Economic  Committee,  93 Cong. 
1 sess. (1973).  Similar  comments  were  made both orally  and in private  papers  circulated 
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All of this has changed  dramatically  since 1969.  In each  of the two most 
recent  periods  reported  in Table 8, the dollar sustained  the greatest  per- 
centage  change in the effective  exchange  rate among the ten currencies 
listed. Furthermore,  as the United States  entered  the era of double-digit 
inflation,  fears  arose  about  further  deterioration  in the value  of the dollar 
vis-a-vis  the currencies  of countries  with lower rates  of inflation-in par- 
ticular,  the Deutsche  mark. 
There  is, however,  a strong  argument  for regarding  the relatively  large 
fluctuations  of the dollar  in part  as a transitional  phenomenon,  a temporary 
divergence  between  the stock and flow equilibria  resulting  from a pro- 
longed  period  of disequilibrium.53  Once the desired  shift in the composi- 
tion of reserve  assets,  both official  and  private,  is completed,  a major  cause 
of volatility  in the valuation  of the dollar  vis-'a-vis  other  currencies  should 
disappear,  unless  some new disturbance  causes  another  dramatic  shift in 
the desired  composition.54  And a smoothly  functioning  mechanism  for 
international  payments  adjustment  should  forestall  a renewed  divergence 
between  stock and flow equilibrium  in the foreign  exchange  markets. 
THE POLITICAL  DIMENSIONS  OF A  KEY  CURRENCY  ROLE 
So far, this discussion  has concerned  the economic  factors  that impinge 
on the dollar's  role  as a key or vehicle  currency.  But  its acceptability  in this 
role depends  on the preferences  not only of private  entities  but also of 
central  bankers,  who are  heavily  influenced  by political  as well  as economic 
considerations.  From the point of view of participants  in other  countries, 
the benefits  from a key currency  system  accrue  primarily  in the efficiency 
associated  with integrated  markets  and in the existence  of international 
money. The costs are perceived  primarily  as the greater  vulnerability  to 
economic developments  and policies in the key currency  country, and 
therefore,  a loss of control  over  the domestic  economy. 
This  interdependence  is felt  most  acutely  in the  domestic  monetary  policy 
of non-key  currency  countries.  "Flows  of [Eurodollar]  funds  into and out 
53. See Walter S. Salant, "The Post-Devaluation  Weakness of the Dollar," BPEA 
(2:1973), pp. 481-96. 
54. Indeed,  the demand  for dollars  to make oil payments  appears  already  to have re- 
duced  substantially  the magnitude  of the "dollar  overhang"  problem  in the eyes of other 
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of the market  across currency  borders  influence  the respective  rates of 
growth  of money  and credit  of countries  so affected-with the exception 
of the United  States  itself."55  And, while  the extent  to which  foreign  mone- 
tary  authorities  can offset  or sterilize  the impact  of such  currency  flows  on 
their own money supplies  is uncertain,  their efforts  to induce monetary 
restraint  undoubtedly  have been at least partially  frustrated  by inflows  of 
funds  from abroad. 
The  major  channel  for transmitting  external  influences  is the Eurodollar 
market.  "The  euro-dollar  market  is more than an appendage  to the New 
York money  market,  but the linkage  is very  close and the degree  of inde- 
pendence  of the euro-dollar  market  from New York is limited."56  One 
reason  for the close linkage  is the dominant  position  of U.S.-owned  banks 
in the  Eurocurrency  market.  The  share  of Eurocurrency  deposits  in London 
held in foreign  branches  of American  banks rose from 24 percent  at the 
end of 1963  to a peak  of 54 percent  at the end of 1969.  It then  dropped  off 
to 43 percent  by the end of 1972,  presumably  reflecting  the growing  impor- 
tance  of non-U.S.  participants  in the market  and of Eurodeposits  denomi- 
nated  in currencies  other  than dollars.57  There  is also some evidence  that, 
since  the repayment  in 1970  and 1971  of large  borrowings  by U.S. banks 
from the Eurodollar  market,  foreign  loan demand,  and therefore  foreign 
money  market  conditions  and regulations  affecting  Eurodollar  borrowing, 
has become  a more  important  factor  in Eurodollar  rates.58 
Traditionally,  the integration  of national  markets  has rested  on depen- 
dence rather  than interdependence:  a one-way  relationship  in which the 
United  States  was  effectively  immune  from outside  influences.  In his study 
of the international  transmission  of wage  inflation  over  the  period  1956-71, 
Nordhaus  concluded  that  the  United  States  exerted  a powerful  influence  on 
prices  abroad  because  it "is the only country  that does not (or can afford 
not to) care  seriously  about  the effect  of its price  level on its external  posi- 
tion."59  Similarly,  over  the period  1953-71  "inflows  from  abroad  have  not 
played a significant  role in weakening  the impact of monetary  restraint 
55. Geoffrey Bell, The Euro-Dollar  Market and the International  Financial  System 
(John Wiley, 1973),  p. 42. 
56. Ibid., p. 64. 
57. Bank of England, Quarterly  Bulletin, Vol.  10 (March 1970), p. 48;  Vol.  13 
(March 1973),  Tables 8(1), 8(8); and various  intervening  issues. 
58. Mikesell  and Furth, Foreign  Dollar Balances,  pp. 76-77. 
59. William D.  Nordhaus, "The Worldwide Wage Explosion," BPEA (2:1972), 
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Table  9. Ownership  of U.S. Gross  Public  Debt, 1958-73 
Dollar amounts  in billions 
Held by  foreign and international  investors 
Held by 
private  As percent  As percent 
Yeara  Total  investors  Amount  of total  of private 
1958  $283.0  $202.3  $ 7.7  2.7  3.8 
1959  290.9  210.6  12.0  4.1  5.7 
1960  290.2  210.0  13.0  4.5  6.2 
1961  296.2  214.8  13.4  4.5  6.2 
1962  303.5  219.5  15.3  5.0  7.0 
1963  309.3  220.5  15.9  5.1  7.2 
1964  317.9  222.5  16.7  5.3  7.5 
1965  320.9  220.5  16.7  5.2  7.6 
1966  329.3  219.2  14.5  4.4  6.6 
1967  344.7  222.7  15.8  4.6  7.1 
1968  358.0  228.5  14.3  4.0  6.3 
1969  368.2  222.0  11.2  3.0  5.0 
1970  389.2  229.9  20.6  5.3  9.0 
1971  424.1  247.9  46.9  11.1  18.9 
1972  449.3  262.5  55.3  12.3  21.1 
1973  469.9  261.7  55.6  11.8  21.2 
Source: Federal Reserve  Bulletin, various issues. 
a.  End of period. 
[in the United States],"60  while capital  flows arising  from developments 
and  policies  in the United  States  do at times  interfere  with  monetary  policy 
in other  countries. 
In the 1970s,  however,  the United  States  has increasingly  become  a part- 
ner  in two-way  interdependence.  The increasing  share  of the foreign  sector 
in the U.S. economy  and the major  role of external  factors,  including  the 
effective  depreciation  of the doliar,  in the acceleration  of U.S. inflation  in 
1973  have  already  been  discussed.  In the financial  sphere,  the most impor- 
tant  exposure  of U.S. markets  to influences  from  abroad  has come  through 
the dramatic  increase  in foreign  ownership  of the U.S. public  debt,  revealed 
in Table  9. The massive  accumulations  of dollars  by foreign  central  banks 
during  the monetary  turmoil  of 1971-73  meant that some 70 percent  of 
the estimated  total unified-budget  deficit of $66 billion incurred  by the 
federal  government  in that period  was financed  by foreigners,  and more 
60. Warren D.  McClam, "Credit Substitution and the Euro-Currency  Market," 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, No.  103 (December  1972), p. 330. 576  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1974 
than 75 percent  of the estimated  $30 billion increase  in marketable  debt 
outstanding  was acquired  by foreign  holders.6'  Even though  econometric 
evidence  suggests  that,  prior  to 1972,  changes  in foreign  central  bank  hold- 
ings of Treasury  bills had only small, short-term  effects  on Treasury  bill 
rates,62  foreign  ownership  of such a substantial  portion  of the public  debt 
cannot  help but expose  this important  segment  of U.S. financial  markets 
to external  influences. 
A substantial  literature  has alleged  that the United States  has derived 
"seignorage"  benefits  from  its key currency  status,  enabling  it to finance  a 
payments  deficit  at a cost below the true or competitive  rate of interest. 
In fact, however,  both private  and official  foreigners  hold dollar  balances 
in interest-bearing  form,  and the competitiveness  and financial  sophistica- 
tion that characterize  the international  money  market  make it highly  un- 
likely  that  even  the  U.S. government  can  exercise  the  monopolistic  exploita- 
tion involved  in seignorage.63  Although  the interest  rates  paid on Treasury 
bills are lower  than rates  of return  on real capital,  this advantage  is more 
accurately  regarded  as a liquidity  premium  than as a seignorage  profit. 
Ironically,  one period  during  which  the United States  may have garnered 
seignorage  gains  was 1971-73,  when  the major  purchases  of U.S. govern- 
ment  securities  by foreigners  doubtless  held  down  the cost of financing  the 
U.S. deficit.  But this was a special  circumstance  associated  with a period 
of breakdown  and transition,  rather  than a characteristic  of a smoothly 
functioning  key currency  system.64 
Seignorage  gains aside, the broader  issue is whether  the special role 
played  by the dollar  under  the Bretton  Woods system  reinforced  or com- 
61. Richard V. Adams, "Foreign Activity in United States Treasury  Securities  in 
Fiscal Years 1971-1973,"  in Issues  in Federal  Debt Management,  Proceedings  of a Con- 
ference  Sponsored  by the Federal  Reserve  Bank of Boston, June 1973  (FRBB, no date), 
p.  195. 
62. Thomas D. Willett, "Discussion" (of Adams' paper) in Issues in Federal  Debt 
Management,  pp. 201-02. 
63. See Ronald I. McKinnon,  Private  and Official  International  Money:  The Case  for 
the Dollar, Essays in International  Finance 74 (Princeton  University,  International  Fi- 
nance  Section, 1969), pp. 21-23. 
64. The lure of these earnings  was undoubtedly  a major stimulus  to the Eurodollar 
market,  and its growth  has served  to bid down monopoly  rents  in both the European  and 
the American  banking systems. There is an important  distinction between seignorage 
and the additional  earnings  derived  from performing  international  banking  and financial 
services,  which are indeed  a benefit  conferred  by the key currency  function. Marina  v. N. Whitman  577 
promised the freedom of the United States to pursue domestic economic 
targets. A related question was whether the greater flexibility in domestic 
policy that was afforded by the ability to postpone adjustment of payments 
imbalances-if,  indeed, it existed-was  exercised to the detriment of other 
countries and of the international  monetary system itself. This complex and 
still unsettled issue will not be recapitulated here; in any case, I believe it 
is largely irrelevant to the future international monetary system, for two 
reasons. First, by universal agreement, the rules of the future international 
monetary system-whatever  its precise nature and the dollar's role in it- 
will not permit the protracted and cumulative disequilibria  in external posi- 
tions that characterized  the Bretton Woods system. Second, the deepening 
vulnerability of the United States to external disturbances raises its stake 
in maintaining a smoothly functioning international monetary system. 
Present  Realities  and  Prognosis  for the System 
The simple taxonomy given at the beginning of this paper encompasses 
three kinds of mechanisms for ensuring the consistency of the international 
monetary system: one operates under universal automatic rules, such as 
the gold standard or freely floating exchange rates; the second under agreed 
rules and a supranational authority; and the third with a key currency. 
Although the present system is frequently described as one of floating 
exchange rates, it actually falls within none of these three classifications. 
Rather, it is a system in transition, without clearly defined rules, operating 
with "probably the widest combination of exchange systems ever with the 
exception perhaps of the 1930's," in the words of an IMF official. As of 
June 1973, this same official noted, 
we have 10 countries  floating  with different  degrees  of intervention;  we have 8 
countries  floating  as a bloc, maintaining  a very close relationship  among  them- 
selves, but with no obligation  whatsoever  to defend a rate with respect  to the 
dollar;  and  we have 24 countries  that have  pegged  their  currencies  with  respect  to 
the dollar;  14 with  respect  to the French  franc;  and 11  with  respect  to the pound; 
and we have 53 other countries  that have either declared  central  rates or par 
value which they defend by intervening  in any of the 3 above-mentioned  cur- 
rencies.65 
65. Statement  of Ricardo H. Arriazu, Alternate Executive Director, International 
Monetary  Fund, in How Well  Are Fluctuiating  Exchange  Rates Working?  p. 107. See also 
Economic  Report  of the  President,  Februiary  1974,  Table 53, p. 197. 578  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1974 
As this brief  summary  suggests,  the present  system  is marked  by active 
and,  to a considerable  extent,  uncoordinated  behavior  by national  govern- 
ments  and  central  banks.  Yet with  respect  to direct  intervention  in foreign 
exchange  markets,  there  has apparently  been  considerable  consultation,  at 
least  to avoid  working  at cross-purposes  and  to provide  intermittent  mutual 
support.  Rather,  the failure  to coordinate  has been demonstrated  in "in- 
direct"  intervention:  central  bank or government  activities  undertaken  to 
modify  or restrict  the behavior  of the foreign  exchange  markets. 
One  form of indirect  intervention  by which  countries  may seek  to mini- 
mize losses of reserves  or, alternatively,  depreciation  of their  currencies  is 
foreign  (as opposed  to domestic)  borrowing  by governmental  or govern- 
ment-related  authorities.  France,  Italy, the United Kingdom,  and Japan 
were  among  the countries  that used this technique,  primarily  in the Euro- 
dollar market,  to strengthen  their payments  positions in late 1973 and 
early  1974. 
The time-honored  method of modifying  exchange  rate or reserve  posi- 
tions is some form of direct controls on trade, investment,  or financial 
transactions  or, sometimes,  all three.  The  period  since  August  15, 1971,  has 
witnessed  escalation  of controls  for balance-of-payments  purposes,  mostly 
by surplus  countries  in an effort  to limit capital  inflows  and thus forestall 
or, more  often,  restrict  appreciation  of their  currencies.  That  such  controls 
were  apparently  ineffective  in stemming  the inflowing  tide of funds  did not 
prevent  these  countries  from  applying  them  in more  and  more  diverse  forms 
and progressively  tightening  them.66 
Even  during  1973  and the first  part  of 1974,  after  the move to "general- 
ized  floating,"  direct  restrictions  for balance-of-payments  or exchange-rate 
purposes  remained  in force.  The relaxation  of restrictions  on imports  and 
imposition  of taxes or controls on exports  were, with a few exceptions, 
directed  at alleviating  domestic  inflationary  pressures  or avoiding  shortages 
of scarce  commodities  rather  than at modifying  a country's  external  posi- 
tion. But  with  the onset  of the oil crisis  at the end of 1973,  liberalization  of 
import  restrictions  among  developed  countries  tapered  off. In a few coun- 
tries with severe  payments  problems,  the liberalizing  moves were in fact 
reversed;  in the most dramatic  example,  in May 1974,  Italy  imposed  a 50 
66. See International  Monetary  Fund, Annual  Report,  1974,  pp. 44-46; Economic  Re- 
port of the  President,  February  1974,  Table 54, pp. 198-99; IMF Survey,  Vol. 3 (Septem- 
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percent  deposit  requirement  on imports,  including  those  from  its Common 
Market  partners. 
Such  exceptions  apart,  direct  controls  aimed  at a country's  external  posi- 
tion continued  to be applied  primarily  to capital  account  transactions  in 
1973  and  the first  part  of 1974.  Efforts  to curb  capital  inflows  were  stepped 
up in many  developed  countries  early  in 1973,  and  were  often  accompanied 
by measures  liberalizing  capital  outflows.  A major  exception  to the pattern 
was Japan  which,  with an extensive  program  of exchange  controls  already 
in place,  emphasized  relaxation  of controls  on both capital  outflows  and 
direct  foreign  investment  in Japan.  By the latter  part  of 1973,  after  the oil 
embargo,  the dominant  trend  was moderated  or even  reversed,  with  many 
developed  countries  moving  to liberalize  capital  inflows  and,  in a few cases, 
even reintroducing  measures  to curb  capital  outflows.  Again, there  was a 
major  exception:  the United  States  announced  liberalizing  steps  in each of 
its three  capital  control  programs  during  1973;  moreover,  encouraged  by 
the substantial  strengthening  of the dollar  during  the second  half of 1973 
and  by the safety  valve  that  floating  exchange  rates  offered  against  specula- 
tive disasters,  it abolished-technically,  suspended-all three  programs  in 
January  1974. 
Monetary  reform  will obviously  follow an evolutionary  course,  incor- 
porating  many  of the changes  that have  taken  place  in the early  seventies; 
but the preceding  paragraphs  suggest some of the dangers  inherent  in 
simply  leaving  things  as they are. At present  most countries  behave  as if 
they have explicit  current  account objectives,  and therefore  implicit  ex- 
change  rate targets,  rather  than as if they are willing  to allow exchange 
rates  to move  freely  to clear  the foreign  exchange  markets.  In the situation 
of late 1973 and the first  part of 1974,  these objectives  led a number  of 
important  countries  to make  liberalizing  adjustments;  other  circumstances, 
however,  would  generate  pressures  toward  increased  controls,  as they did 
throughout  most of 1973  and the years  immediately  preceding. 
Not only are  the targets  of individual  countries  generally  uncoordinated 
and therefore  likely  to be inconsistent,  but the recent  drastic  shifts  in the 
terms  of trade between  oil-producing  and oil-consuming  countries  make 
the problem  of reconciling  them  virtually  intractable.  It was one thing  for 
most industrialized  countries  to aim for current  account  surpluses  when  a 
surplus  for the group  as a whole  was the natural  counterpart  of the collec- 
tive deficit  of the developing  countries.  But  it is quite  a different  matter  for 
individual  industrialized  countries  to aim at surpluses  when  the group  as a 580  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
whole  must run a collective  deficit  as the counterpart  of the massive  sur- 
pluses  of the oil producers.67  Efforts  to use exchange  rate  policies,  whether 
direct  or indirect,  to achieve  such surpluses  can only result  in pushing  the 
inevitable  deficits  around  among  the oil-consuming  countries,  and  is bound 
to be self-defeating  as well as damaging  to the already  hard-hit  developing 
countries  that lack petroleum  or other  costly essential  commodities.  The 
price  of uncoordinated  external  targets  and  exchange  rate  policies  has  risen 
sharply. 
Under these circumstances,  there are strong pressures  for the United 
States  to resume  some sort of nth-country  role,  modifying  its own current 
account  target  in the interest  of stabilizing  an international  system  under 
extreme  stress.  These  pressures  are mounting  as it becomes  clear  that the 
investments  fed by the burgeoning  surpluses  of the oil-producing  countries 
will be concentrated  in a few strong-currency  countries,  the United  States 
probably  chief  among  them.68  Unless the United States  takes  active  steps, 
such  capital  inflows  will  bring  about  appreciation  of the dollar  and  a nega- 
tive impact  on the U.S. current  account. 
Indeed, there is some question as to whether  the United States has 
actually  abandoned  its nth-country  role. For, despite  this country's  insis- 
tence on symmetry  of the adjustment  mechanism  and on its own freedom 
of action on exchange  rates  in a reformed  international  monetary  system, 
and despite  the Federal  Reserve's  commitment  in principle  to exchange 
rate  intervention  under  certain  conditions,  actual  intervention  by the  United 
States  has been limited.  Apart from the two official  devaluations  of the 
dollar,  the United States  remains,  as it was under  the Bretton  Woods sys- 
tem, "largely  passive  as to its exchange  rates."69  Were it to desert  this 
67. The industrial  countries  as a group experienced  a decline  in their reserves  during 
1973. See International  Monetary  Fund, Annual  Report,  1974, p. 37. 
68. Of the estimated $25 billion to $28 billion surplus  accumulated  by the OPEC 
countries  during  the first  eight  months  of 1974,  the U.S. Treasury  estimates  that some $7 
billion has been invested  in the United States, with the bulk of the remainder  currently 
held  in the form of short-term  Eurocurrency  deposits.  See "The  Financial  and Economic 
Consequences  of the Quadrupling  of the Price  of Oil," submission  to the Senate  Perma- 
nent Subcommittee  on Investigations  in conjunction  with testimony  by Secretary  of the 
Treasury William E. Simon,  September  18, 1974, in Department of the Treasury News, 
W.S.-108  (September  20,1974), pp. 4-5. 
69. Henry C. Wallich,  "CXX and After," Finance,  Vol. 92 (September  1974), p. 6. 
Indeed, an active exchange  rate policy for the United States is fundamentally  incom- 
patible  with the continued  use of the dollar as a major  intervention  currency.  Hence the 
recent  interest  in alternative  intervention  schemes,  described  in Annex 3 of the Outline 
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passivity  for active  management  in order  to buttress  its current  account 
against  the pressures  just described,  the effect  would  be greatly  to exacer- 
bate the strains  imposed  on the international  monetary  system  by recent 
developments  in the world  economy. 
Clearly,  the United States  cannot  undertake  an unlimited  commitment 
to passivity  under  the present  circumstances.  It could not, for example, 
tolerate  a concerted  refusal  by other  oil-consuming  countries  to accept  any 
current  account  deficits  whatsoever,  which would impose on the United 
States  the entire  burden  of the counterpart  to the projected  annual  current 
account  surplus  of $60  billion  to $80  billion  of the oil producers.  Even  more 
fundamentally,  the United States could not tolerate  the fluctuations  in 
unemployment  that would result  if the nth-country  role were  to produce 
wide short-term  swings in the current  account. Any U.S. commitment 
would have to be delimited  in multilateral  negotiation  among the oil- 
consuming  countries  to establish  a framework  for balance-of-payments 
adjustment  to the new world  petroleum  situation.  Yet the United States 
must  assume  leadership  in these  negotiations.  Any such  leadership  is almost 
certain  to require  of the United  States  more  flexibility  and  responsibility  in 
adapting  its payments  situation  to the needs of the group  than the other 
oil-consuming  participants  will be willing  (or perhaps  able)  to undertake. 
In summary,  then, this argument  for the continuation  of some key cur- 
rency  role for the dollar,  as opposed  to the strict  symmetry  of rights  and 
obligations  envisaged  in the major  reform  proposals,  reinforces  the argu- 
ments  based  on cQnvenience  and  efficiency  discussed  in the  previous  section. 
At the moment  and  for the foreseeable  future,  no substitute  on the horizon 
can match  the dollar  for transactions  convenience  or asset  liquidity.  And, 
although  one can conceive  of the dollar continuing  in its private  inter- 
national  roles  even  if it dropped  out of its official  ones,  there  is considerable 
complementarity  between  the two, and governments  as well as the private 
sector  reap  efficiency  gains  from the existence  of an international  money. 
The fulfillment  of a key currency  role requires  also a resumption  of the 
dollar's  superior  performance  with respect  to inflation-and this is uncer- 
tain. But over the long term,  the dollar  has maintained  more stable  pur- 
chasing  power  than any other  major  currency  and, despite  the aberrations 
of the past year or two, this relationship  is unlikely  to be permanently 
altered.  Even  more  to the point,  while  the restoration  of reasonable  stabil- 
ity in the value of the dollar  is essential  to the successful  operation  of a 
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for the viability  of any international  monetary  system.  The belief  that  even 
a symmetrical  system  of freely  fluctuating  exchange  rates  could  fully insu- 
late  countries  from  inflationary  disturbances,  particularly  those  originating 
in a major  country,  is being considerably  modified  in the light of recent 
experience. 
To foresee,  and  even  to advocate,  some  form  of key currency  role  for the 
dollar  is by no means  to suggest  a return  to the Bretton  Woods  system.  The 
need  for a prompt  and effective  adjustment  mechanism,  most probably  in 
the form of managed  exchange  rate  flexibility  with rules  for intervention, 
has already  been stressed.  Such a process  is essential  both to avoid the 
economic  strains  imposed  by prolonged  disequilibrium  and to give the 
participants  in the international  monetary  system control, within some 
range,  over  the rate  at which  international  reserves  are  created.  At the same 
time,  the  replacement  of the  convertibility  mechanisms  of the gold  standard 
with a modified  form of asset convertibility  involving  SDRs seems  both 
likely  and desirable.  Consultations  among  major  countries  and agreement 
to be guided  by the International  Monetary  Fund are likely to be more 
important  in achieving  consistency  among external  objectives  than they 
were  under  the Bretton  Woods system.  Finally,  the key currency  concept 
is not an all-or-nothing  proposition.  As the relative  importance  of other 
countries  in the world economy  grows, it is logical that their currencies 
should  acquire  some international  role; SDRs can also play a useful  part 
in the official  key currency  functions.70 
When  all this has been  said,  however,  there  remains  no acceptable  alter- 
native  to the dollar  in all its key currency  roles.  Moreover,  consistency  in 
external  targets  is unlikely  if the  United  States  does  not assume  some  special 
responsibility  for the international  monetary  system.  The appeal  to sym- 
metry  and the United States'  assertion  of an active exchange  rate policy 
were  essential  to pry  the international  system  loose from  its prolonged  dis- 
equilibrium  and to restore  the nearly  paralyzed  exchange  rate  mechanism 
as an instrument  of adjustment.  With that task accomplished,  the new 
demands  of international  political  economy  and considerations  of market 
efficiency  and convenience  together  suggest  that efforts  to achieve  strict 
symmetry  of rights  and obligations  should  not be pushed  too far. It is, of 
course,  inherently  difficult  to embody  legal asymmetry  in any document 
70. de la Giroday  points out in Myths  and  Reality  (p. 10) that at no time since about 
1900  has one standard  or numeraire  had a complete  monopoly of the key currency  role. 
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that requires  the formal  approval  of sovereign  states.  Given this tension 
between  the legal pressures  for symmetry  and the economic  pressures  for 
asymmetry,71  the world might do better to modify its efforts  toward a 
comprehensive  formal  constitution  for the international  monetary  system 
in the Bretton  Woods mold, in favor of the more informal,  piecemeal, 
evolutionary  international  monetary  constitution  that is already  taking 
shape. 
71. On this point, see Cooper, "Eurodollars,  Reserve Dollars, and Asymmetries," 
pp. 327, 344. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Richard  N. Cooper:  Marina  Whitman  has  provided  an admirable  summary 
of the issues  in monetary  reform  and the changing-or, in her view, rela- 
tively  unchanging-role of the dollar.  My remarks  are not so much com- 
ments  on her  paper  as questions  and observations  prompted  by reading  it. 
The first question  is, why have controls  on international  transactions 
increased  in Europe  rather  than  diminished  with  the introduction  of float- 
ing exchange  rates?  A number  of continental  Europeans  warned  us this 
would  happen;  but some  Anglo-Saxons,  including  myself,  said  it shouldn't 
happen  (although  we didn't  say that it wouldn't  happen).  In fact, except  in 
the United  States,  controls  have  been broadened,  even if only modestly  in 
some cases. 
One  might  be tempted  to say that governments  are  ignorant  and are  just 
making  a mistake.  But I suggest  that this group  of controls  reflects  strong 
and, to some  extent,  justified  anxieties  about  the impact  of exchange  rates 
on wage  inflation.  The  fear is that a depreciation  of the currency  will spur 
an increase  in wages  and in turn  will lead to a further  depreciation  of the 
currency  through  an increase  in product  prices.  The effect  is asymmetrical: 
an appreciating  currency  will not induce  a comparable  decrease  in wages. 
The controls are meant to break the inflation  cycle of wages-exchange 
rate-wages. 
The second  question  that comes to mind on reading  the paper  is, why 
have  floating  exchange  rates  not insulated  economies  from  inflationary  im- 
pulses  from  abroad  as some  advocates  said  they  would?  Part  of the answer 
lies in the fact that exchange  rates  have  not floated  freely.  But in any case 
I think that the insulating  characteristics  of floating  exchange  rates were 
oversold.  First, floating rates cannot insulate economies  from real dis- 
turbances,  as distinguished  from monetary  disturbances.  Many of the 
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disturbances  causing the inflationary  impetus have been real, like the 
failure  of crops  and  the oil cartel.  A second  factor  is the cash-balance  effect. 
Suppose  that,  in a world  of floating  rates,  capital  flows  into country  A out 
of a country  B that has an unusually  strong  monetary  expansion.  Unless 
that flow is accompanied  by increases  in B's export  prices,  the monetary 
disturbance  abroad  will add to the liquidity  of country  A, if not through 
an actual  capital  inflow  then  through  an appreciation  of A's  currency  which 
lowers  import  prices measured  in that currency.  How important  such a 
cash-balance  effect is in quantitative  terms is, in my view, an open em- 
pirical  question.  But conceptually  it could be a channel  for international 
transmission  of purely monetary  disturbances  even with freely floating 
rates.  A third  possible  reason  why floating  exchange  rates  have not insu- 
lated  economies  from inflationary  impulses  from abroad  is that they may 
have relaxed  the restraint  on government  spending  that was imposed  by 
concern  about the balance  of payments.  Some observers-most of them 
not professional  economists-have long felt that governments  are always 
straining  at the bit to increase  expenditures,  and that they will inflict  more 
inflationary  damage  with  floating  exchange  rates  because  they will not be 
punished  by balance-of-payments  deficits.  The record  is consistent  with 
that  view,  at least  to the extent  that,  in many  countries,  much  of the mone- 
tary expansion  after 1970  has arisen  from domestic  credit  creation  rather 
than  from the growth  of international  reserves. 
A third  question  is about  Whitman's  suggestion  that the United States 
should  after  all play the nth-country  role in this period  of very  large  pay- 
ment flows arising  from the increase  in oil prices.  If Japan  and Western 
European  countries  are  free  to set their  external  targets  and if they  choose 
ultimately  to pay for their oil with goods (as I would  expect)  rather  than 
to borrow  indefinitely,  they would  be expanding  exports  enormously.  Let 
me reinforce  the paper's  conclusion  that we really  cannot  accept  the $60 
billion  to $80  billion  deficit  in U.S. trade  implied  by this  country's  assump- 
tion of the residual  role. I suggest  that mercantilist  strains  would develop 
in America  with a force never seen before. Understandably,  American 
labor  in particular  would  not tolerate  the required  closing  down of major 
industries.  I submit that realism  limits the potential scope of the nth- 
country  role. 
I have two other observations.  First, the problem  of dollar overhang, 
which  several  years  ago was one of the major  issues  in international  mone- 
tary reform,  seems  now to have vanished.  Not that the dollars  are fewer, 586  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1974 
but  most  holders  of dollars-Japan,  for example-are happy  to have  them. 
They will be gradually  transferred  to OPEC  countries,  and eventually  a 
new dollar  overhang  may emerge  there.  Meanwhile,  the attraction  of gold 
as an official  monetary  medium  seems  to have faded,  as a result  partly  of 
this new  confidence  in dollars  and  partly  of the highly  erratic  performance 
of gold prices. 
My final comment  concerns  the question  of symmetry  in the interna- 
tional  monetary  system.  There  is a contradiction  between  the formal  equal- 
ity of sovereign  nations  and the actual  inequality  among  them  based  upon 
military,  political,  and economic  importance.  In formal  arrangements,  na- 
tions  declare  their  sovereign  rights  and  national  dignity,  and  insist  on equal 
treatment.  This is especially  pertinent  in the monetary  area and would 
create tensions in any American-type  constitutional  convention  or any 
formal  Bretton  Woods-type  reform  of the monetary  system.  As Whitman 
suggests  in her conclusion,  it would be better  to develop  a system  infor- 
mally,  in the manner  of the British  rather  than  the American  constitution. 
Such  an evolutionary  process  would  not confront  nations  with  the need to 
assert  their  sovereignty  and  could  reflect  a consensus  that otherwise  would 
not be possible. 
Robert  Solomon:  Marina  Whitman  has given  us an interesting  paper,  with 
a wealth  of useful  material.  But, to be frank,  I am unsure  about  what  the 
real  issues  are  in the question  of leadership  versus  symmetry.  "Leadership" 
implies  something  more than large arithmetic  weight,  but the paper  tells 
little about the economic  and political  aspects  of any unique  role of the 
dollar. 
Because  it forms  an important  part  of the historical  background,  let me 
start with a query concerning  Whitman's  interpretation  of the Bretton 
Woods  agreement.  She  characterizes  it as envisaging  a symmetrical  system. 
Yet the Articles  of Agreement,  while  specifying  that member  nations  will 
have an obligation  to maintain  their exchange  rates within 1 percent  of 
their  par values,  also specifies  that "a member  [it's  in the singular]  whose 
monetary  authorities,  for the settlement  of international  transactions,  in 
fact  freely  buy and sell gold ...  shall  be deemed  to be fulfilling  this under- 
taking"  (p. 5). This  seems  to suggest  that  the  United  States  would  be the  nth 
country,  at least with respect  to intervention  in exchange  markets.  Thus 
the original  concept  of Bretton  Woods  may not have  been as symmetrical 
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made no explicit  provision  for systematic  growth  of world reserves.  I'm 
too young to know whether  the founding  fathers  expected  the dollar to 
play that role, too. 
In any event, whether  or not it was envisaged  at Bretton  Woods, the 
international  monetary  system  did function  in an asymmetrical  manner  in 
the postwar  period.  The United States  was the nth country  in respect  to 
intervention  in exchange  markets  and to concern-or, rather,  lack of it- 
about its overall  balance  of payments,  though the latter  asymmetry  was 
not clear-cut.  Efforts  were  made  to reduce  U.S. deficits,  mainly  by means 
that most economists  disapprove  of. U.S. deficits  did make  it possible  for 
other  countries  to satisfy  their desires  or targets  for growing  reserves  as 
their economies expanded  and as world trade increased.  But was the 
United  States  also the nth  country  with  respect  to current-account  targets? 
I'm not at all sure. Significantly,  the system  broke down only when the 
surplus  in the U.S. current account disappeared.  The United States did 
have  a rough  current-account  target  and  other  countries  expected  it to have 
one. This last observation  may be a criticism  more of Robert  Triffin  than 
of Whitman,  since it provides  an explanation  of the so-called  inevitable 
breakdown  different  from  Triffin's. 
The  postwar  monetary  system  rested  on the assumption  of an unchanged 
dollar  price  of gold, on which  other  countries  relied  as they accumulated 
dollars  as reserves.  The disappearance  of the surplus  in the U.S. current 
account  in 1970, combined  with the unwiliingness  of the major surplus 
countries  to appreciate  their  currencies  against  the dollar,  led to the mas- 
sive flight  from the dollar  and the suspension  of convertibility  on August 
15, 1971. 
Out of all this  came  the U.S. proposals  for a reformed  system  that  would 
be symmetrical  in most respects.  These  proposals  are  well  described  in the 
paper,  as is the  product  of the Committee  of Twenty  and  the  ambivalence  in 
U.S. positions  during  the negotiations  that  led to it. Whether  that  ambiva- 
lence reflected  merely  negotiating  tactics or a secret  desire  to preserve  a 
reserve-currency  role for the dollar  or a difference  between  George  Shultz 
and Paul  Volcker  is a question  that is not easily  answered. 
The discussion  in the paper  of the various  roles of the dollar  in private 
transactions  raises  questions.  An elaborate  table on private  international 
liquidity  shows  the rise  and fall of the share  of dollar-denominated  liabili- 
ties in total liabilities.  My reaction  is, so what?  In fact, I doubt that the 
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really  matter  to the  system if a Danish  businessman  decides  to hold  balances 
in the  Eurodollar  market  rather  than  in his own  currency  in a Danish  bank? 
What  advantage,  economic  or political,  does the United  States  derive  from 
the fact  that  nearly  three-fourths  of so-called  private  international  liquidity 
is in dollar-denominated  assets?  It seems  to me to be relatively  unimportant 
from  the viewpoint  of leadership. 
The most interesting  questions  arise  with respect  to the dollar's  role in 
official  transactions.  To begin  with  a quibble,  I believe  it is a mistake  to re- 
gard the growing  use of effective  exchange  rates (rather  than exchange 
rates  expressed  in dollars)  as a decline  in the official  role of the dollar.  The 
concept of effective  exchange  rates represents  an advance  in economic 
sophistication  that we should  all welcome.  In the period  leading  up to the 
Smithsonian  meeting,  blood, sweat, and tears  had to be shed to make it 
clear  that  a country  could  be devaluing  against  the world  while  its currency 
appreciated  against  the dollar.  Furthermore,  I see no connection  between 
the sensible  practice  of looking  at effective  exchange  rates  and the prefer- 
ences of countries  as to the currency  in which  they hold their  reserves. 
With  respect  to the official  role  of the dollar,  the major  issues  are  a blend 
of economic  and political  considerations  and influences.  U.S. monetary 
policy can undermine  anti-inflationary  policies  in other  countries  not be- 
cause  the dollar  is a vehicle  and reserve  currency,  but because  the United 
States  is so large  and  because  its own  monetary  policy  is seldom  influenced 
by external  considerations.  Even if the United States had financed  its 
deficits  entirely  with  SDRs (assuming  it had had enough  of them),  the sur- 
plus countries  would  have had a problem  in preventing  unwanted  mone- 
tary  expansion  at home. The ability  of the United States  to incur  overall 
deficits  without  running  out of reserves  did give it some extra  freedom  in 
pursuing  domestic  policies.  (That  freedom,  incidentally,  was bolstered  by 
U.S. capital controls.  As Cooper argues,  controls  permitted  the United 
States  to run a more autonomous  monetary  policy without  overly antag- 
onizing  other  countries.)  Whether  the United States  derived  other  signifi- 
cant advantages  from the ability to run deficits  is less clear. The paper 
properly  disposes  of the seignorage  issue. I have always  believed  that the 
economic  advantages  to the United States,  apart  from  freedom  for mone- 
tary policy, were  relatively  minor.  And since the asymmetry  is a political 
irritant  to other  countries,  this  country  stood  to lose little  economically  and 
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The entire  C-20  reform  negotiation  can be summarized  as an effort  by 
other  countries  to end the so-called  "exorbitant  privilege"  of the United 
States  to run "deficits  without  tears,"  while  the United States  held that it 
could  take  this  step  only  with  assurances  of an effective  adjustment  process 
that  would  make  a convertibility  commitment  possible.  The  major  question 
therefore  is whether  the United States  will continue  to be an international 
money  creator.  This is the asymmetry  that bothers  the rest of the world, 
for both political  and economic  reasons. 
Throughout  the reform  exercise,  no one expressed  a wish  to replace  the 
dollar  in its leading  role as a private  asset,  and it is likely  to continue  long 
in that  role;  but that  is of little  importance,  as I have  tried  to suggest.  What 
international  harmony,  political and economic, requires  is a system in 
which  the United  States  is subject  to constraints  in its capacity  to flood the 
world  with reserves.'  In exchange  for this, it should  demand,  and has de- 
manded,  a strengthened  adjustment  process  in which  it is not required  to 
be passive  or to precipitate  an international  crisis  in order  to bring  about  a 
change  in its effective  exchange  rate. That important  degree  of symmetry 
should  be attainable. 
This  whole  question  is now complicated  by the tendency  of oil exporters 
to accumulate  assets in the form of dollars.  These accumulating  claims 
should  be regarded  not as reserves,  but as long-term  capital  outflows  from 
OPEC countries  and as long-term  capital inflows to the United States 
insofar  as they come here. Another  complication  is whether  the new sys- 
tem will  be one of managed  floating  rather  than  of par  values.  In my view, 
the difference  between  managed  floating  under  international  surveillance 
and truly  adjustable  par values  is minor. 
Finally,  I do not understand  the assertion  in the last paragraph  of the 
paper  that "consistency  in external  targets  is unlikely  if the United States 
does not assume  some special responsibility"  for the system. Does this 
mean U.S. passivity?  That would be a return  to the status  quo ante. Or 
does it mean an active  role for the United States,  the largest  country,  in 
the attempt  to agree  in the IMF and the OECD on a set of consistent  tar- 
gets and on policies  to achieve  them?  The latter  approach  seems  to me to 
be the course  that is called  for by economic  and political  realities. 
1. Although the United States had this potential  for the entire period from the end 
of World  War  II until 1973,  the average  annual  increase  in foreign  official  dollar  holdings 
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General  Discussion 
Several  of the discussants  sought  to distinguish  more sharply  a number 
of issues  about the role of the United States  in international  finance:  the 
private  use of the dollar  as an international  vehicle  currency,  its official  use 
as a reserve  asset, the nth-country  role for the United States  in interna- 
tional  payments,  and U.S. leadership  in world  financial  decisions.  William 
Poole  discussed  the  use of the  dollar  as a world  currency  for  private  transac- 
tions, and saw that as its most important  special  function.  Weir Brown 
noted  that  the  nth-country  role  for  the  United  States  was  primarily  a passive 
arrangement,  quite  separate  from  the need  for U.S. economic  and  financial 
leadership  among  nations.  Similarly,  widespread  holdings  of dollars  abroad 
do not necessarily  add to U.S. power,  according  to Frank  Schiff.  That  de- 
pends, he suggested,  on where  the decisionmaking  power  lies on the ac- 
cumulation  and  disposition  of the holdings.  In principle,  the currency  held 
could be the American  dollar  while  the decisionmaking  mechanism  could 
be multilateral.  In fact, said Stephen  Magee, the United States  had given 
away  power  in the form  of political  favors  before  the devaluation  to induce 
foreign  central  banks  to hold on to their  dollars.  While  she was willing  to 
view these as separate  issues, Marina  Whitman  doubted  that they were 
independent  of each other. 
In connection  with  private  demands  for dollars,  William  Gibson  pointed 
out that the asset certainty  of dollar-denominated  securities  is dependent 
upon  the stability  of interest  rates  as well as the stability  of exchange  rates 
and the price  level. He observed  that the variability  of U.S. interest  rates 
has risen  along with the variability  of inflation  rates. 
Magee  thought  that  the discussion  of the world  role of the dollar  should 
be organized  as a cost-benefit  analysis  of the various  functions.  Presumably 
there  is a net world  gain from the key currency  role if the alternatives  to 
the dollar are less efficient.  Whitman  said people have had, and still do 
have,  a preference  for the dollar  as world  money,  from  which  she inferred 
a perceived  efficiency  advantage  for the dollar in comparison  with any 
available  alternatives.  Magee and William  Branson  were generally  con- 
cerned  about the impressionistic  concepts  of "symmetry,"  "leadership," 
and the like. Branson  thought  these (as well as "openness"  and "inter- 
dependence")  could  be constructively  formalized  in a model  that specified 
their  meaning  in terms  of key parameters. Marina  v. N. Whitman  591 
Franco Modigliani  warned  that the burden of the oil-induced  trade 
deficits  could  be maldistributed  around  the world  unless  the decisions  are 
carefully  coordinated.  The  disposition  of OPEC  capital  exports  should  not 
be allowed  to determine  the trade deficits.  Instead,  all countries  should 
agree  upon  target  trade  deficits,  with  the size  of the oil deficit  of each  coun- 
try as a first-approximation  target for its trade deficit. Such a decision 
would avoid shifting  resources  temporarily  into export  industries  during 
the energy  squeeze.  Branson  suggested  that the United States  could stand 
a larger  share  of the total  trade  deficit  without  encountering  the protection- 
ist reactions  Cooper  had mentioned  if its economy  were  expanding  rather 
than contracting.  Cooper  reiterated  his expectation  that some industrial 
countries  would  not be willing  to incur  large  and  prolonged  debts  and  thus 
would  not accept  their  share  of the trade  deficit.  Hence,  even  in an expand- 
ing economy,  the United  States  could  not accept  a completely  passive  role. 
More generally,  Hendrik  Houthakker  argued  that national  policy ob- 
jectives  may include  particular  targets  for trade,  foreign  investment,  and 
the like, rather  than mere overall  payments  equilibrium.  The emerging 
trade  deficit  of the United States  in 1969-71  generated  protectionist  pres- 
sures  that contributed  to the devaluation  of the dollar  and the end of the 
Bretton  Woods  system.  The United States  has gradually  eliminated  tariffs 
and it has no export  duties.  The main  instrument  for influencing  the trade 
account  is thus the exchange  rate, but changes  in it may at times affect 
direct  investment,  other  capital  accounts,  and  nontrade  items  in the current 
account  in undesirable  ways.  Houthakker  thought  the  United  States  should 
have  the option  of imposing  export  duties.  But  his main  point  was to stress 
the variety  of "real"  consequences  of changing  the exchange  rate,  some of 
which tend to be blurred  in a financially  oriented study like Marina 
Whitman's  paper. 